MYANMAR’S Rakhine State with 36,780 square kilometres of land area is composed of seven districts — Ann, Kyaukphyu, Maungdaw, Mrauk-U, Sittwe, Taungup and Thandwe. As of December 25, the Arakan Army has taken the full control of five districts — Ann including western command headquarters, Maungdaw, Mrauk-U, Taungup and Thandwe along with the Paletwa in the neighbouring Chin State. The Arakan Army is now focused on Sittwe, the capital of Rakhine State and Kyaukphyu. India has 484 million dollar investment on Kaladan Multimodal Transport Transit project in Sittwe. Kyaukphyu has military significance to junta. China has strategically important investment in Kyaukphyu. A complete fall of Rakhine State appears a matter of time.
The change of control of the Rakhine State created streams of challenges for all stakeholders, including Bangladesh. Bangladesh’s stakes in Rakhine are different from those of others. The most important stake is the repatriation of more than 1.2 million Rohingyas. To repatriate Rohingyas, Bangladesh has adopted three approaches — internationalisation of the refugee issue, China-brokered bilateral agreement with Myanmar and a joint working group involving Bangladesh, China and Myanmar. Talks on the repatriation has stalled since the Chinese ambassador’s remark at a press conference on May 10, 2021 that he did not see any possibility of holding a tripartite meeting in the ‘foreseeable future’ and there is no such plan to hold such a meeting involving China, Myanmar and Bangladesh. Since then, there has not been any progress in the bilateral or tripartite arrangement. Interim measures detailed by the International Court of Justice on the protection of Rohingyas remaining inside Myanmar had no effect either. In seven years, none of the options yielded results.
Besides concerns for Rohingya repatriation, Bangladesh has grave unease at a probable increase in the unfettered supply of synthetic drugs from Myanmar. The junta-controlled Bangladesh-Myanmar border was porous, with drugs from Myanmar entering Bangladesh. An insecure border will be haven for illicit drug smugglers. In the changed situation, Bangladesh will need cooperation from the Arakan Army to keep the smuggling of drugs, arms and other contraband items in check. But it is discussed in the diplomatic circle that a state entity cannot engage diplomatically with a non-state actor. The thought contradicts the theory of necessity or the theory of reality. Bangladesh is yet to make a decision on border management.
The desolate expanse on the Bangladesh’s eastern maritime frontier is a potential ground for a wider conflict between the Arakan Army and the Myanmar navy. Apart from the Bangladesh-Myanmar land border, Rakhine coast is a life line for the Arakan Army. The junta navy could impose naval blockade to cut the lifeline. With this probability in mind, the Arakan Army could develop its maritime wing to run through the blockade.
The Arakan Army’s takeover does not portend peace in Rakhine. Rakhine State will remain restive until the fall of regime in Nay Pyi Taw. A restive Rakhine coast will affect the use of the sea by the coastal population of Teknaf and St Martins Island. They will become victims of the fight between the Arakan Army’s sea component and the Myanmar navy. Recent conflicts along the Myanmar coast spilled over into the waters of the River Naf and waters adjacent to St Martins Island, killing innocent Bangladeshi fishers. The Arakan Army and the Myanmar navy also abducted fishers at sea. They are already in the line of fire at sea. Bangladesh will have to act to defend them.
Bangladesh has always been in a dilemma in deciding the appropriate course of action except solving the face-off at sea in 2008. Bangladesh failed to appreciate the military junta’s intention after the Kofi Anan Commission’s report on the integration of the Rohingyas into Myanmar society. Bangladesh also failed to understand the purpose of Myanmar’s military build-up in northern Rakhine in June–July 2017. While the army was bringing in extra forces into northern Rakhine, the Arakan Army and the Myanmar army were holding an unofficial ceasefire. Warring parties normally do not move personnel or war materials while a truce or ceasefire is in force. Extra forces were brought in to conduct the planned Clearance Operation to evict the Rohingyas.
Ignorance or insouciance about the political and military developments across the Bangladesh’s eastern border with Myanmar together with political leadership’s debated wish resulted into a historical blunder to bear the burden of more than 1.2 million refugees and pushed the country into the uncertainty with their repatriation. Blunder was repeated by planning to relocate 100,000 refugees to Bhashan Char, far away from the Bangladesh-Myanmar border. The military regime in Nay Pyi Taw must have interpreted the relocation scheme that Bangladesh has accepted refugees and integrating them into main stream population. Consequently, the regime became disinterested in the repatriation talk. Another blunder was not creating leadership within the Rohingya community. The community needed a leader to keep them organised for settling in their homes in Myanmar.
The national unity government in June 2021 in a historical declaration cleared its position on the Rohingyas. The national unity government recognised the Rohingya as an ethnicity in Myanmar and announced the repatriation of the Rohingyas with full citizenship and other rights after toppling the military junta that had taken control of the country through a coup in 2021. The national unity government, Myanmar’s government in exile, was interested to have dialogues with Bangladesh. But it has not been in communication.
The Arakan Army was also interested in engaging with Bangladesh after the Brotherhood Alliance had launched military campaign on October 27, 2023 to topple the junta. As Bangladesh was hesitant to engage officially with the national unity government or the Arakan Army, track 2.0 or 2.5 level engagement could be a feasible option. On the other hand, India and China have played all sides — the national unity government, the Arakan Army and other armed groups fighting the regime. They also maintained a diplomatic engagement with the military ruler in Nay Pyi Taw. In December 2024, India officially invited the national unity government, the Arakan Army, the Chin National Front and the Kachin Independence Army to a seminar hosted by the Indian Council of World Affairs, a think-tank funded by the Indian government. China also held an official meeting with the Arakan Army in Tengchong, China on December 1.
In the context of the change of control of Rakhine State and situation unfolding in Myanmar, Bangladesh should shrug off shakiness and be decisive about engaging all stakeholders fighting the regime for democracy in Myanmar, and in particular the stakeholders in Rakhine politics.
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Mohammad Abdur Razzak ([email protected]), a retired commodore of Bangladesh navy, is a security analyst.
