THE future of Venezuela鈥檚 25-year-old socialist movement will be decided in the upcoming July 28 election. Venezuelans will go to the polls knowing that a vote for incumbent president Nicol谩s Maduro means no relief from US unilateral coercive measures.
These so-called 鈥榮anctions鈥� have been central to Washington鈥檚 regime-change campaign explicitly designed to asphyxiate the Venezuelan economy and turn the people against their government; what Venezuelanalysis calls 鈥榓 war without bombs.鈥�
Venezuela, with some 930 unilateral coercive measures imposed on it by the US, is the second most sanctioned country in the world after Russia. 鈥榃ashington singled out Venezuela for special treatment,鈥� observes political economist Steve Ellner.
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The Bolivarian revolution
VENEZUELA鈥橲 Bolivarian Revolution began with the election of Hugo Ch谩vez in 1998. Having a proud Afro- and indigenous-descendent from a poor background as president, infuriated racist and classist elite sentiment. Ch谩vez鈥檚 successor, Maduro, a bus driver and union leader who never went to college, was no more palatable to this elite.
Under Ch谩vez鈥檚 leadership, Venezuela became 鈥榓 beacon of hope for the struggle against neoliberal immiseration and imperialist pillage for the world over,鈥� according to Francisco Dominguez with the UK-based Venezuela Solidarity Campaign.
Approximately three-quarters of Venezuela鈥檚 current discretionary budget goes to social expenditures; about the same proportion of the US budget going to the military and related expenses. Some five million houses for the poor have been built, health care is free, and food for the poor is subsidized. Mass popular organizations and communes flourish.
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A quarter century of US regime-change efforts
CH脕VEZ survived a US-backed coup in April 2002 that lasted only 47 hours, when the people spontaneously arose and demanded his reinstatement. That was followed by a 鈥榖oss鈥檚 lockout鈥� during the Christmas holidays, which failed to create an uprising but did cause a 29 per cent GDP loss.
A referendum, openly backed by the US, to recall Ch谩vez in 2004 was decisively defeated. He won the 2006 presidential election by a large margin, although the opposition continued to foment lethal street violence. A military coup in 2008 by dissident officers was aborted.
Ch谩vez was reelected in October 2012 but died from cancer shortly thereafter in March 2013. His chosen successor, Maduro, won the constitutionally mandated snap election by a margin of less than 2 per cent. Sensing weakness at this moment of national mourning, the US offensive intensified, trying to provoke a civil insurrection.
The main opposition candidate, Henrique Capriles, immediately charged fraud and called on his followers to show their rage. Violent street demonstrations by the US-backed far-right opposition followed. The so-called guarimbas continued periodically through 2017 in an attempt to achieve by extra-parliamentary means what they failed to do democratically.
The US was the only country to deny the legitimacy of the Maduro government in 2013. A subsequent audit done in public, which compared the electronic count to the paper ballots, reaffirmed the electoral outcome. Former US president Jimmy Carter, incidentally, commented: 鈥榦f the 92 elections that we鈥檝e monitored, I would say the election process in Venezuela is the best in the world.鈥� Venezuela was the first country to have both an electronic vote and a paper backup.
After Maduro won the presidency, the international oil market tanked, which severely impacted an economy dependent on petroleum sales. With the deteriorating economic situation, the opposition won a majority of the National Assembly in December 2015. The Maduro government immediately recognized the electoral results. Today, Washington considers the 2015 National Assembly the only legitimate government of Venezuela, even though the legislators鈥� terms have long ago expired.
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Hybrid war intensifies
THAT same year, 2015, US president Obama incredulously declared Venezuela to be 鈥榓n unusual and extraordinary threat鈥� to US national security as a pretext to impose illegal unilateral coercive measures. That year, too, marked a regional geopolitical shift to the right with the election of Mauricio Macri in Argentina.
The coercive measures were harshly intensified by Trump and continued with some minor relief with Biden in a bipartisan effort to defeat the Bolivarian Revolution.
The US took no chances in anticipation of the 2018 presidential election in Venezuela. Washington declared the election fraudulent a full half year before the vote and ordered its funded proxies to boycott. When opposition politician Henri Falc贸n ran, Washington threaten him with sanctions. Maduro easily won reelection. The far-right opposition sat out the election, still banking on a military coup, a popular rebellion, direct US intervention鈥r a successful assassination.
While at a public ceremony, Maduro survived an exploding drone attack in August 2018. In October of that year, the former US ambassador to Venezuela, William Brownfield, opined, 鈥楢t this moment perhaps the best solution would be to accelerate the [county鈥檚] collapse, even if it produces a greater period of suffering.鈥�
By January 2019, the Venezuelan economy, plagued with runaway inflation, was teetering on breakdown precipitated by the economic blockade imposed by the US and its allies. Washington then recognised the unknown new head of the national assembly, 35-year-old Juan Guaid贸, as 鈥榠nterim president鈥� of Venezuela. Over 50 US allies recognised the US security asset and handed Guaid贸鈥檚 team billions of dollars of Venezuelan assets held abroad.
Venezuela was also subject to paramilitary attacks launched from Colombia across its western border. A cyber-assault on Venezuela鈥檚 electric system triggered a nationwide blackout in March 2019. Among the continuing assassination and coup attempts was the May 2020 so-called 鈥榖ay of piglets鈥� fiasco involving two former US Green Berets, who Biden subsequently repatriated in a prisoner exchange.
Also in 2020, the US officially designated Maduro as their 鈥榥ew target鈥� and put a $15 million bounty on his head. Washington鈥檚 unilateral coercive measures had by then produced a precipitously declining economy plus the collateral damage of tens of thousands of deaths. Venezuela experienced the largest peacetime economic contraction in recent world history.
Of course, corruption, inefficiencies, and plain mistaken policies also plagued the economy. But to be fair to the victims of the sanctions, these were hardly conditions unique to Venezuela and would not have been devastating absent the sanctions. Otherwise, the US would not have needed to have been so inhumanely aggressive. Further, secondary effects of sanctions, such as the need for secrecy to circumvent them by using back channels, became fertile grounds for dishonest officials.
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Venezuela resists
ALTHOUGH the US hybrid war continued, Venezuela began to reverse the economic free-fall around 2021鈥�2022. This could not have been done without a combination of an unflinching political will under the leadership of president Maduro coupled with strong grassroots popular support; plus vital help from Russia, China and Iran.
GDP growth during the first four months of 2024 exceeded forecasts of the International Monetary Fund and are projected to be 4 per cent for this year, compared to IMF figures for the US at 2.7 per cent and China at 4.6 per cent.
After a series of corruption scandals, even the hardline opposition abandoned 鈥榠nterim president鈥� Jaun Guaid贸. Today only the US, Israel, and a handful of Washington鈥檚 most sycophantic allies fail to recognise the Maduro administration.
A recent internal house cleaning on the government鈥檚 side saw former oil minister Tareck El Aissami along with 54 others arrested for corruption; a development much celebrated by the Chavista base (ie, supporters of the Bolivarian Revolution).
Contrary to the US strategy to isolate Venezuela, Venezuela may soon join BRICS+ and was recently elected to a vice presidency of the UN General Assembly. Another game-changer was that Venezuela鈥檚 two immediate neighbours, Brazil and Colombia, went from US client states to friendly allies.
The regional integration organisations initiated by Ch谩vez, such as ALBA and CELAC, remain robust. Meanwhile Biden was humiliated when Mexico led a boycott after he excluded Venezuela along with Cuba and Nicaragua from his planned Organization of American States 鈥榙emocracy summit鈥� in 2022.
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Election campaign homestretch
THE fact that all opposition factions will compete on the ballot is de facto recognition of the government鈥檚 legitimacy. And the fact that there are nine such candidates is proof, despite Washington鈥檚 best efforts, that the US could not unite a fractious opposition around Maria Corina Machado鈥檚 far-right candidacy.
The aforementioned Machado had been thoroughly vetted in DC and was Washington鈥檚 chosen candidate. Appearing before a US congressional committee, she threatened not to have 鈥榓 system of impunity鈥� for the Chavistas when she鈥檚 president. However, she is not on the ballot.
Back in 2015, Machado had been disqualified from running for office until 2030 for multiple wrongdoings. The US ordered her to contest before the Venezuelan supreme court, but the ban was upheld. Machado鈥檚 NGO, S煤mate, was funded by the NED, a CIA cutout. Her current campaign activities reportedly received $3.2 million from a US lobbying firm.
Machado personally chose surrogate candidate Edmundo Gonz谩lez to run in her place. The elderly Gonz谩lez has mainly stayed home, while Machado hit the campaign trail with a paper poster of Gonz谩lez. This arrangement gives the US the option to claim victory if Gonz谩lez wins and to claim fraud 鈥� because of Machado鈥檚 disqualification and other concerns鈥� if he doesn鈥檛.
All but Gonz谩lez and another far-right presidential candidate pledged to abide by the results of the election.
Meanwhile, the government reported sabotage of a bridge and the electrical grid, while multiple assassination attempts on Maduro have been thwarted. A Colombian paramilitary group, ACSN, reportedly was contacted by opposition elements to attack infrastructure and even the president in the contingency of a Maduro victory.
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Election outcome not at all certain
ALTHOUGH the US still does not formally recognise the Maduro government, Washington and Caracas 鈥� this time with the Venezuelan opposition excluded 鈥� engaged in direct dialogue as equal sovereigns just a month before the election. This signals that the US strategy for regime change now has to be different from the 2018 election. The far-right opposition cannot be ordered to boycott the election in anticipation of the government collapsing. Venezuela鈥檚 economy is no longer on the ropes, despite Washington鈥檚 best efforts.
However, Venezuelan political commentator Clodovaldo Hern谩ndez cautions about ongoing issues of inadequate healthcare delivery, salaries and pensions that have not kept pace with inflation, erratic electric power, and dysfunctional police and judicial services. All of these disproportionately impact the Chavista base of poor and working people, who are wearied by so many years of Yankee siege. On the other hand, much of the opposition is discredited and detested precisely because they supported the US hybrid war that contributed to those conditions.
As ever, polling in Venezuela produces highly partisan and unreliable results. Both Chavistas and opposition/Voice of America cite polls showing overwhelming support for their side.
The whole world will be watching on July 28. Venezuela has strived to offer an alternative to the imperialist world order and endured decades of attacks as a consequence. Will the majority of Venezuelans vote to continue their independent path despite such heavy costs?
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CounterPunch.org, July 15. Roger Harris is on the board of the Task Force on the Americas, a 32-year-old anti-imperialist human rights organisation.
