THE Sheikh Hasina-led Awami League regime is over after 16 years and we are now in a new phase which is best described as interim. From the look of things, it seems to be heading towards the earlier pre-2007–8 BNP-Jamaat alliance phase.
A new phase has emerged and a new regime is ensured. However, certain matters have remained constant in our history — including the fact that no matter how huge a civil resistance movement is, in the end, it is the military which has to intervene to put the book to rest. In fact, state power has changed hands among military factions in which civilians played no role but the military has the last say in regime changes. Why?
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August 2024 liberation and historical trend
A PERUSAL of the record is interesting.
— In 1969, which according to many was the largest street movement before 1971, it did not end transfer of power to a civilian regime but with martial law.
— In March 1971, streets were loud and the Awami League government was in charge of civil politics and even issued governance-related directive outside formal power till March 25, 1971. But the civilian public resistance to Pakistan ended with a military crackdown on them, not their state takeover. Later, the Mujibnagar government was formed but in India, not in Bangladesh.
— In 1971, the fate of the events was neither resolved at the United Nations or the negotiating table nor political rhetoric but on the battlefield by two contending armies.
— In August 1975, the crisis of the post-1971 governance flaws, including the exclusion of benefits to all except pro-Awami League political elements — not even the army — and imposition of one party rule led to the August 15 takeover by a section of the army.
— Internal conflict within the army and the attempt by a section of the army as a political force led to the November 1975 coup with the mainstream army as the main player.
— In 1990, the anti-Ershad movement was again street-based but the change could take place only when the army refused to back the president and the change took place to an interim civilian regime along with ‘informal’ adjustment of the constitution.
— In 2006, the street movement of the Awami League against the Bangladesh Nationalist Party did not usher in a change but a military takeover which lasted till 2008.
— In 2024, street protests overwhelmed police power, but that did not end the Hasina regime until the army refused to back her against the crowd and she had to depart with the military calling the regime-changing shots.
The lesson is clear and sobering. The military is the principal agent of regime change in the political space of the state of Bangladesh although it is populated by various political parties. It seems that it is not civil politics that can trigger a regime change but the only formal organised agency of the informal state.
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From quota to constitution
THE 2024 conflict began over quota in the formal job system, including the most coveted BCS cluster. This is the most important governance cluster running the civilian part of the state and includes safe extra-legal income for most. Hence, the stakes are high.
The quota conflict involves the statist section of Bangladesh or the crony regime network or the ruling class. There are several segments of this class, including the amlas, the businesspeople and the politicians. Together, they make up the informal crony-based governance cluster. It is ‘informal’ as that is not a constitutional product of the state. Hence, it is the informal structure of both governance and wealth-making that is based on a variety of give-and-takes and Bangladesh is basically run by them.
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No formal governing structure
THE informal structure of Bangladesh has not developed any formal mechanism for the transfer of power and elections have showed to be very informal and dysfunctional, claiming constitutional roots though. It looked to be improving, — 1991–2006 — but the system has not improved.
Even in that period, it could be done only under a ‘neutral caretaker system of government’ to supervise elections as no political party trusts each other to be able to run fair/legitimate elections. That is true which a fair assessment given most past elections seems.
When participating political parties do not or cannot develop a functional formal transfer of state power mechanism and no party trusts another, it means the state and its agencies, including the mother book, the constitution, is largely part of an informal space and not really in use or relevant.
When internal class struggle peaks within the informal space, upheaval and turmoil occur as has been seen many times in the past. This causes stress that threatens the stability of both the formal and informal institutions and the agencies on which all power clusters depend. When no option is left, the system pushes the only formal agency in the country, the armed forces, to step in. Thus, the formal forces rescue the informal in an ironic sense to keep both going on within the state space.
Unless the informal governing state space becomes formal of which there is no indication as yet, there is no reason why the current pattern will not continue with the army acting as the last resort of political crisis management. Or should the nature of the state — formal or informal — be examined?
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Afsan Chowdhury is a researcher and journalist.
