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THE Shahbagh movement of 2013 and the recent July-August uprising stand as defining chapters in the evolving narrative of Bangladesh’s socio-political history. The two protests, distinct in origins and goals though, explain interwoven paths of public mobilisation, collective memory and the exercise of state power. The Shahbagh movement emerged from a nation’s quest for justice, its rallying cry demanding the death penalty for Abdul Quader Molla, a leader of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami convicted of war crimes of the 1971 Liberation War. This protest was an expression of national pride and historical trauma, uniting urban youth, activists and civil society actors under a singular vision of rectifying the moral wounds of the past.

In contrast, the July-August uprising has emerged as a call for systemic transformation. It has grown from the discontent of people grappling with governance failures, rampant corruption and widening economic inequality. Unlike Shahbagh’s narrowly focused pursuit of historical accountability, the 2024 uprising has represented a more inclusive and expansive demand for structural reforms, justice and institutional transparency. It has sought to confront the inequity and the authoritarianism that had taken root in the nation’s political and economic frameworks.

Together, the protests offer a comparative lens to explore the dynamics of grass-roots activism, the role of state power and the nuanced interplay between justice, democracy and authoritarianism. By examining the watershed events through a theoretical framework, it could be possible to shed light on the intricate forces that shape collective action and governance and delve deeply into the legacy of protests, reflect on how they challenge the understanding of sustainable democracy and chart a course for civic engagement.

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Theoretical frameworks

THE social movement theory provides for a critical framework to understand the organisational dynamics and resource mobilisation that sustained both Shahbagh and the July-August uprising.

Social movement theory

Shahbagh protests: The movement harnessed key resources that included state support, the approval that the Awami League tacitly lent to the protests for political legitimacy and material support; media and civil society that prositioned the protests as a moral crusade, by widening its reach through extensive coverage and intellectual promotion; and digital activism that mobilised the youth on social networks to spread information and create a collective identity.

July-August uprising: The protests was more characterized by a decentralised grass-roots organization; its leadership remained largely independent while political groups tried to co-opt the events; the uprising addressed tangible grievances such as inflation, unemployment and inequality, mobilising diverse demographics; and broad participation with representation from rural and marginalised communities unlike the Shahbagh protests.

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Cultural theory

The cultural theory underlines the role of collective memory and symbolism top drive the mobilisation.

Shahbagh protests: The movement was rooted in the cultural memory of the 1971 liberation war. It invoked nationalistic pride through symbolism, Shahbagh being used as the protests site linked to the movement of Bangladesh’s struggles;Ìý artistic expressions such as slogans, songs, and poems that lent a cultural resonance to the protests that spoke about national identity; and moral framing, which projected the demand for the death penalty as a moral duty to save the dignity of the nation.

July-August uprising: The events were designed using a wider cultural critique such as economic and social justice, which was born out of systemic injustice; and modern symbolism, which used modern icons such as social media influencers and grass-roots leaders to reach a digitally active generation.

Political process theory

The political process theory studies the role of political opportunities along with institutional mechanisms in influencing the outlines of movements.

Shahbagh protests: In alignment with state power, the government’s support meant immediate political and institutional support but questioned the judiciary’s independence; Judicial instrumentalisation that resulted in the amendment to legal changes to appease the demands of the protests, which came about as certain threat to the politicisation of justice; and delegitimisation of opposition in which Jamaat-e-Islami, among others, had been systematically belittled.

July-August uprising: The uprising came upon a political void and economic discontent, capitalising on general discontent; and in contrast to Shahbagh protests, the uprising established its own political opportunities through the bottom-up organisation and challenge to the entrenched political elite.

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Fascism as lens

BOTH the protests present contrasting dynamics that invite an analysis through the lens of authoritarian and democratic tendencies. The Shahbagh protests, in an overt alignment with state power and reliance on orchestrated narratives, displayed characteristics more closely associated with fascist traits. In contrast, the July-August uprising emerged as a grass-roots effort, actively challenging authoritarian structures and seeking to dismantle entrenched systems of oppression, positioning itself as a movement aimed at resisting fascism and advocating for inclusive reform.

Mass mobilisation

Shahbagh’s mass gatherings, amplified by media and state resources, mirrored the theatrical populism associated with fascist movements; and in contrast, the mobilisation in the July-August uprising was dispersed and less dependent on the dramaturgy of the movement.

Suppression of opposition: The Shahbagh protests demonised any opposition, labelling critics as anti-patriotic and repressing Islamist counter-movements. The July-August uprising was suppressed by the state, but it retained its plural voice and, therefore, inclusivity.

State propaganda: The Shahbagh events relied heavily on state-driven narratives to frame themselves as a moral crusade; but the July-August uprising used social media and grass-roots communication to counter state propaganda.

Exclusionary nationalism: The Shahbagh rhetoric marginalised pluralistic debates, sidelining alternative approaches to justice; but the July-August uprising sought inclusivity, addressing systemic issues across social and economic divides.

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Role of govt and policy

Shahbagh protests

State facilitation: The government facilitated protests, providing administrative and logistical support while suppressing opposing movements; and judicial interventions: Legal amendments such as retroactive application of harsher sentences, demonstrated responsiveness to public pressure but compromised judicial independence.

July-August uprising

State suppression: The government sought to quell protests through crackdown, media censorship and targeted arrests; and resistance to co-optation: Despite attempts by political parties to hijack the movement, its leadership maintained autonomy, underscoring its grass-roots origins.

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Comparative implications

Democratic deficit

The Shahbagh protests have exposed critical vulnerabilities within Bangladesh’s democratic framework, especially regarding the risks associated with state co-optation of grass-roots activism. While the movement had genuine calls for justice at its inception, its eventual alignment with government narratives and reliance on state-backed media made the line separating organic public mobilisation and orchestrated populism increasingly thin. This raised concern about dissenting voices being marginalised and judicial processes becoming politicised, undermining pluralism and independence standards normally associated with a healthy democracy.

In contrast, the July-August uprising emerged as a robust demand for systemic reforms, fastening accountability, inclusivity and institutional restructuring. Unlike the Shahbagh events, which got entangled with state interests, the July-August uprising retained its grass-roots authenticity, representing a broader spectrum of public grievances. This distinction highlights a critical evolution in the nature of political mobilisation — one that underlines the population’s growing insistence on genuine democratic processes and transparency, free from state manipulation.

Polarisation

The Shahbagh events deepened the crack within society, especially along ideological and partisan lines. By framing its cause as a moral crusade tied to nationalism, the events alienated large sections of the population, especially those critical of its alignment with the ruling party or sympathetic to Jamaat-e-Islami. This binary framing — patriot versus traitor — exacerbated ideological rifts and fostered an environment where dissent was vilified, leaving little room for nuanced debate or reconciliation.

In contrast, the July-August uprising was intrinsically polarising in its critique of the entrenched elite and governance failures yet tried to bridge demographic divides by uniting diverse groups under a shared demand for justice and systemic change. The movement’s inclusivity across classes, professions and regional identities underscored its intent to build solidarity rather than deepen fragmentation. However, its confrontational stance against the political establishment still pose challenges to fostering national cohesion.

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Legacy

THE legacy of the Shahbagh protests is multi-layered. It sets a very dangerous precedent, on the one hand, where state-backed mass mobilisation was used to push forward an agenda and opened up the potential for misuse by future governments to consolidate power or decimate opposition. The Shahbagh protests, on the other hand, also shows the power of collective memory and grass-roots activism in forcing major national discourses, even within a limited framework shaped by state influence.

In contrast, the July-August uprising 2024 represents a shift towards grass-roots empowerment and a rejection of authoritarian tendencies. It is a critical juncture in political development because it challenges the status quo and focuses on bottom-up reform. Although the ultimate outcomes of the uprising are uncertain, its emphasis on inclusivity and systemic change has set the stage for a potential recalibration of governance and civic engagement. The two protests put together show the interaction of power, activism and democracy in carving the political topography.

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Conclusion

THE Shahbagh protests of 2013 and the July-August uprising of 2024 epitomise two very different yet inextricably interwoven trajectories of political mobilisation in socioeconomic history. Both born as a result of dissatisfaction felt by society and the demands thereof for justice, they explain and illustrate the transformative capabilities that come with collective action. Their course then, however, sharply diverges vis-à-vis scope, method and implications for democracy.

The Shahbagh protests had the depth of collective memory and national identity in invoking a whole nation in unfinished business in historical justice for atrocities of 1971. Its catch-all slogans, high level of cultural resonance, and emotional appeals for accountability made the movement a high-water mark. However, the way that mobilisation aligned with state power, exclusionary nationalism and suppression of dissent proved to be one of the risks of the authoritarian drift that always haunts state-backed mobilisation movements. As Benjamin Franklin once warned, ‘Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.’ Shahbagh’s articulation along state mechanisms underlined the fragility of justice versus erosion of democratic mores.

In contrast, the uprising of July-August reflected a greater critique of systemic failures. It channelled public disappointment with governance issues, economic inequality and institutional decay into a grass-roots movement of inclusivity seeking structural reforms. In sharp contrast to the Shahbagh events, this uprising celebrated diversity in its critique of the entrenched elite and failed institutions, uniting disparate demographics under a common vision for justice and systemic change. As Nelson Mandela once said, ‘A critical, independent and investigative press is the lifeblood of any democracy.’ That ethos was best exemplified in this 2024 uprising to demand accountability from the grass roots up.

These two evens, together, provide for key lessons regarding complexities of justice, democracy and governance. They point at the need to balance historical accountability with pluralism, making sure that the quest for justice does not undermine the very principles of democracy. The Shahbagh events and the July-August uprising remind us of the invariable tension between state power and grass-roots agency, with the risks of co-optation of collective action towards partisan or authoritarian ends.

The evens, as Bangladesh struggles to find the right course of its political journey, stand out as important touchstones on the perennial problems of constructing a viable and inclusive democracy: vigilant nurseries of authoritarianism, a commitment to pluralism and the need to nurture an empowered, independent civil society. As Martin Luther King Jr once said, ‘The arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice.’ For Bangladesh, the lessons of Shahbagh protests and the July-august uprising are like guiding stars on that arc, pointing toward a more fair and democratic society.

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Dr Serajul I Bhuiyan is a professor and former chair of the journalism and mass communications department at Savannah State University, Savannah, Georgia.