WATER disputes between nations frequently emerge from managing shared hydrological resources, mainly when an upstream riparian state exerts control over the source and implements large-scale infrastructural initiatives that may disrupt downstream flow dynamics. India’s extensive hydropower projects on the River Brahmaputra and its tributaries in Arunachal Pradesh have prompted legitimate concern in Bangladesh, a downstream riparian state.
Bangladesh fears that these developments could critically undermine its water security, with potential repercussions for environmental stability and social cohesion. While the objectives of India’s energy generation and flood mitigation strategies are not inherently flawed, such undertakings necessitate an elevated level of responsibility and proactive consultation to maintain regional hydro-political equilibrium. Bangladesh’s concern about India’s upstream hydropower projects on the Brahmaputra is multifaceted, primarily related to water security and environmental impact. According to a US-based Centre for Naval Analyses study, the Brahmaputra supplies 75 per cent of Bangladesh’s river water during the dry season, a critical resource for its agriculture and security. However, Bangladesh already faces a 25 per cent deficit in its required water intake. This situation could worsen because of India’s dam-building activities and water diversion projects upstream.
The water-sharing dynamics between India and Bangladesh have for long been marked by tension, particularly surrounding the Teesta waters accord, which has become a pivotal point of dispute. Despite extensive negotiations, a formal agreement regarding the River Teesta, a vital resource for the agriculture-dependent north of Bangladesh, remains elusive. Under the administration of Sheikh Hasina, there was a period of relative stability in Bangladesh-India relations, with significant expectations for the finalisation of the Teesta accord. However, various political obstacles, especially at the regional level in India, have hindered progress, exacerbating Bangladesh’s apprehension regarding India’s overall water-sharing commitments across transboundary river systems.
After the recent change in government in Dhaka, the future of the collaborative spirit that characterised Hasina’s regime remains in doubt, albeit somewhat uneven. The new leadership in Bangladesh might take a more cautious and assertive approach, particularly concerning the Brahmaputra hydropower projects and the ongoing Teesta issue. Rebuilding the strong bilateral ties developed under Hasina’s administration could be slow, necessitating careful diplomacy. For India, balancing its energy ambitions with Bangladesh’s water security concern will be vital in deciding whether this shared resource will become a source of cooperation or conflict again. There are already signs that India could be jeopardising its relationship with Bangladesh, especially with narratives of unchecked sectarian violence emerging since Sheikh Hasina’s departure. These discussions tend to overlook Hasina’s manipulation of the Hindu minority and the fact that much of the post-uprising violence has been more politically motivated.
In a move to boost the region’s energy capacity, India has recently taken significant steps to advance its hydropower ambitions in the northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh. It committed $1 billion to expedite the construction of 12 hydropower projects on tributaries of the Brahmaputra. This large-scale initiative underscores India’s commitment to developing its hydropower potential as part of its broader energy security and sustainability strategy.
The 12 projects form only a tiny part of India’s larger vision for Arunachal Pradesh, which has an estimated hydropower potential of more than 57,000MW. The projects are strategically planned on various tributaries of major rivers. India’s investment in hydropower development, particularly in its northeastern regions, aims at harnessing the Brahmaputra’s hydropower potential, estimated at more than 57,000MW. These projects also serve as a geopolitical statement, reinforcing India’s sovereignty over regions that China has intermittently laid claim to. While India’s motivations are clear, the unilateral approach to these projects has raised eyebrows. As these dams are built on a river that flows into Bangladesh, the downstream impact causes a grave concern.
Beyond water shortage, Bangladesh also faces the heightened risk of flash floods. India’s release of stored water from its dams could cause flooding in densely populated, low-lying areas, a situation that Bangladesh has been victim to annually. The broader ecological impact, such as disruption to local ecosystems and biodiversity and potential displacement of communities, adds to Bangladesh’s concern. Moreover, despite the northeastern region’s limited demand, India’s plans to transmit electricity generated from these hydropower projects through Bangladesh have sparked further controversy. The Siliguri corridor, the chicken’s neck, poses technical challenges because of the infrastructure, adding strain to Bangladesh’s infrastructure and security. Bangladesh’s installed power generation capacity stands at 28,166MW while the maximum demand recorded by the Power Development Board in 2024 was 17,200MW. This indicates that the power sector has a surplus generation capacity of 38.9 per cent. It raises questions about the necessity of such transmission lines, creating an additional layer of diplomatic tension between the two countries.
International water law, underpinned by principles such as equitable and reasonable use and not to cause significant harm, calls for cooperation between riparian states. Bangladesh has consistently advocated using established diplomatic frameworks, like the Joint River Commission, to resolve water-sharing disputes and ensure that its interests are considered. However, India’s unilateral decisions on the Brahmaputra have been perceived as dismissive of this collaborative approach, intensifying concerns in Dhaka. As the upper riparian state, India carries more significant responsibility. Given the shared nature of the Brahmaputra, India should adopt a more consultative stance, engaging with Bangladesh to placate its concern and actively incorporate them into project planning. A holistic, sustainable approach to managing the river’s resources could benefit both nations, provided trust and transparency are prioritised.
While water security is a pressing issue, it is inextricably linked to broader geopolitical dynamics in South Asia. India’s position as the upper riparian state gives it considerable leverage over its neighbours. Treaties, such as the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 between India and Pakistan, exemplify how water can become both a tool of diplomacy and a potential source of conflict. Although the treaty has held for decades, India’s recent moves to renegotiate specific key provisions point to the enduring complexities of such agreements. India’s move to renegotiate parts of the Indus Waters Treaty with Pakistan signals its shifting approach to water diplomacy. This renegotiation, driven by geopolitical tensions, raises concern about other regional water-sharing agreements, including those with Bangladesh. If the precedent set by the Indus treaty holds, future agreements might increasingly be influenced by regional power dynamics rather than mutual necessity.
In the context of the Brahmaputra, long-term treaties between India and Bangladesh should not be treated as diplomatic bargaining chips. While geopolitical realities cannot be ignored, essential resources like water must not be used as leverage in negotiations concerning trade, border disputes or broader regional security issues. Stable water-sharing agreements are fundamental to peace and cooperation and must withstand transient political and diplomatic fluctuations.
Water disputes are not new in South Asia. Still, their importance has increased as resource demand grows alongside environmental degradation and climate change. As the upper riparian state, India must acknowledge Bangladesh’s legitimate concern. Transparent dialogue, mutual respect and a commitment to sustainable development can transform water from a source of conflict into an avenue for cooperation in South Asia. India and Bangladesh can ensure long-term stability in a region fraught with challenges by fostering trust and creating inclusive frameworks for managing shared rivers.
On the same note, Bangladesh faces a dual threat as China, another riparian state, is also building a dam on the Brahmaputra portions that fall within the Chinese borders. On November 30, 2020, China’s major hydropower project on the Brahmaputra, River Yarlung Zangbo, in Tibet raised concern in India and Bangladesh as the river flows through the two countries. The dam will be built at a massive gorge in the Himalayan reaches. The Brahmaputra makes a massive U-turn to flow into Arunachal Pradesh and then to Bangladesh. The project is raising concerns in riparian states such as India and Bangladesh. India’s 12 projects are likely to have geopolitical and geostrategic implications on countering China’s efforts. Nevertheless, both the countries need to consider the impact of their respective projects on Bangladesh. In contrast, Bangladesh needs to reinforce its diplomatic efforts through all available avenues to ensure that the country can mitigate the ensuing effects of these projects.
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Simon Mohsin is a political and international affairs analyst.
