THE establishment of an independent police commission as an oversight body in Bangladesh is crucial for ensuring accountability, transparency, and efficiency in law enforcement. While the police play a vital role in maintaining law and order, allegations of corruption, political influence, and human rights violations have raised serious concerns about their role in enforcing law and order. A well-structured commission could address these issues by monitoring police activities and enforcing legal and ethical standards.
However, its formation faces significant challenges, including political interference, institutional resistance, financial constraints, and public scepticism. Politicians, bureaucrats, and law enforcement agencies often resist such reforms due to fears of losing control, disrupting existing power structures, and facing greater accountability. The absence of a strong legal framework further complicates efforts to establish a truly independent oversight mechanism.
Since the police administrative reforms commission has recommended its creation, it is essential to analyse the political, administrative, and systemic challenges that hinder its establishment. Interestingly, the report of the reforms commission highlighted that only the young student representative of the police reform committee, speaking on behalf of the youth, advocated for the establishment of an independent police commission to ensure a fair, transparent, and legally accountable police system. In response, the Bangladesh Police headquarters submitted a comprehensive framework for the proposed commission.
However, the ministry of home affairs disagreed and put forward a different version, highlighting conflicting perspectives on the formation of an independent police commission. Despite these developments, the police reforms commission unanimously recommended the formation of an independent and accountable police commission. However, instead of taking a decisive stance, it deferred the decision on whether the commission should be a statutory or constitutional body to expert opinion, thereby delaying the process. This cautious approach appears to be a strategic move to avoid immediate action, given the complexities involved in its formation.
Bangladesh now lacks a comprehensive legal framework for establishing and operating an independent police oversight body. While some existing laws address police accountability, they are often inadequate or poorly enforced, making it difficult for a police commission to function effectively or hold law enforcement officers accountable. Additionally, most existing laws, such as the Police Act 1861, do not provide for independent oversight, necessitating new legislation. In this context, institutional reform in Bangladesh is often hindered by bureaucratic inefficiencies and slow policy implementation.
Even if the government decides to establish a police commission, delays in policy formulation, approval, and execution could significantly obstruct its creation and effectiveness. However, the current interim government presents a unique opportunity to introduce such reforms without facing resistance from political parties. Since the president has the authority to promulgate ordinances without requiring parliamentary approval, this is an opportune moment to establish a legal framework as a statutory body for a police commission, laying the foundation for greater accountability and transparency in law enforcement.
However, creating it as a constitutional entity is impossible due to the absence of a functioning parliament. While immediate reform within the existing legal framework remains feasible, it requires strong political will from the elected government in the future. Notably, the proposal for forming the commission came solely from the young student representative, while other committee members 鈥� including civil bureaucrats, police officers, educationists, human rights activists, and a woman professor 鈥� might have tacit consent.
This lack of collective support raises concerns about institutional resistance or a preference for maintaining the status quo. Given the legal and political landscape, establishing a police commission under the interim government is possible, but without decisive action, the prospect of forming it under a future political government appears bleak鈥攑erhaps nothing more than a forlorn hope.
Political influence poses a significant challenge to the establishment of a police commission in Bangladesh, as law enforcement agencies often face pressure from political leaders, compromising their impartiality and decision-making. If a police commission were to be formed, there is a substantial risk that political interests would undermine its independence and effectiveness. Ensuring the commission remains free from political control is a major concern, given that politicians frequently use the police to suppress opposition, manipulate elections, and maintain control over dissenting voices. They exert influence over police appointments, transfers, and promotions, aligning law enforcement with their interests rather than allowing it to function autonomously. Establishing an independent Police Commission within a robust legal framework would help mitigate such interference, making it more difficult for politicians to manipulate law enforcement for personal or partisan agendas.
Additionally, many politicians rely on law enforcement to harass, intimidate, or arrest opposition leaders and activists, with reports from human rights organisations highlighting the misuse of the police for politically motivated cases and arbitrary arrests. Electoral manipulation is another major concern, as ruling parties often use law enforcement agencies to influence voter turnout, intimidate opposition supporters, or overlook electoral violations committed by their members. A police commission with strong oversight powers could help ensure police neutrality during elections, thereby preventing political interference in democratic processes. This potential loss of control over law enforcement makes many politicians hesitant to support the creation of such an institution.
Although the police force is primarily a law enforcement agency, it is often controlled by civil bureaucrats, particularly through the ministry of home affairs and senior government officials. The establishment of a police commission would introduce an independent oversight body, reducing bureaucratic influence over law enforcement decisions. This shift in authority is likely to be strongly resisted by civil bureaucrats, as it would limit their ability to manage police operations and enforce administrative control.
A police commission would also challenge the existing patronage system, where senior officials reward loyal officers and punish those who do not comply with their directives. Through control over transfers, promotions, and disciplinary actions, many officers build patron-client relationships with bureaucrats, securing career benefits and protection from accountability. An independent commission enforcing merit-based promotions and disciplinary measures would disrupt this system, significantly weakening bureaucratic control over the police.
The bureaucratic system in many developing countries, including Bangladesh, has been widely criticised for corruption, inefficiency, and a lack of transparency. Some civil bureaucrats use their authority over law enforcement agencies to protect personal interests, silence whistleblowers, or shield themselves from corruption investigations. With independent investigative powers, a police commission could expose such misconduct, increasing accountability and reducing opportunities for abuse. This potential threat to bureaucratic authority makes many officials reluctant to support the establishment of a truly autonomous oversight body, as it could limit their ability to manipulate law enforcement for personal or political gain.
If a police commission is established but its members are appointed directly by the political government, there is a significant risk that it will not function as an independent body. Politicians may strategically appoint individuals who are loyal to the ruling party or those who have a history of complying with political directives rather than upholding justice and accountability.
This would compromise the commission鈥檚 ability to act impartially, as members may hesitate to investigate misconduct or take actions that could go against the interests of those who appointed them. Without a transparent and independent selection process, the commission could become a rubber-stamp institution, serving political interests rather than ensuring genuine oversight of law enforcement.
For the commission to function effectively and maintain public trust, its appointment process must be transparent, merit-based, and free from political influence. This requires clear and objective selection criteria, a diverse representation of experts, and the involvement of independent oversight bodies. To prevent undue interference from political parties or government officials, safeguards such as fixed terms for commission members, restrictions on their political affiliations, and strong accountability mechanisms should be in place. By prioritising neutrality, the commission can uphold its integrity and avoid becoming another politically motivated entity that serves partisan interests rather than the public good.
Resistance from within law enforcement agencies poses a significant challenge to the establishment of a police commission. Some members of the police force may view the commission as a threat to their authority, fearing increased scrutiny, restrictions on discretionary power, and potential disciplinary actions. As a result, they may resist its interventions, creating obstacles in its operations.
Additionally, there could be a lack of cooperation in providing essential documents, evidence, and reports necessary for investigations, either due to institutional reluctance or deliberate attempts to conceal misconduct. Overcoming this resistance requires strong legal mandates, clear enforcement mechanisms, and a cultural shift within law enforcement that encourages accountability and transparency. Training programmes, awareness campaigns, and collaboration with independent oversight bodies could help bridge the gap and foster a more cooperative relationship between the police and the commission.
Moreover, the rigid structure of service rules and departmental regulations known as 鈥榖lue bastion鈥� shapes the mindset of police officers, making them largely resistant to reform. Police leadership tends to maintain the status quo in daily operations, rarely initiating change unless faced with pressing challenges. Instead of proactively seeking reforms, officers often raise concerns with higher authorities, and only when a crisis of significant magnitude arises do the leadership consider corrective measures, which may eventually lead to future reform initiatives.
As a government-appointed position, the IGP serves at the discretion of the ruling party, reinforcing a system where the police act in alignment with political interests. This politicisation, coupled with job insecurity, creates a precarious environment for police officers, making them reluctant to support reform efforts, as doing so could jeopardise their positions and career stability.
Public trust in law enforcement agencies in Bangladesh is relatively low due to past incidents of police misconduct, extrajudicial killings, and widespread allegations of bribery and corruption. Many citizens view the police as being influenced by political and financial interests rather than serving the public impartially. For a police commission to be effective, it must not only function independently but also earn the confidence of the people. If the public perceives the commission as merely another bureaucratic institution and commissions lacking real power or the will to enforce accountability, it risks becoming ineffective.
Transparency in its operations, active community engagement, and visible action against misconduct are crucial in shaping public perception. Additionally, educating citizens about the role, powers, and responsibilities of the commission, as well as ensuring public participation in the oversight process, will be essential in fostering trust and legitimacy.
Establishing and maintaining an independent police commission in Bangladesh requires substantial financial and administrative resources, but budgetary constraints could limit its effectiveness. Insufficient funding may lead to inadequate staffing, outdated infrastructure, and restricted investigative capacity, weakening its oversight role. Additionally, recruiting qualified personnel who can impartially oversee police activities is challenging due to political and bureaucratic influences on hiring decisions. Politicians or officials opposed to strong police oversight may deliberately undermine the commission by restricting its budget, limiting access to police records, or refusing to implement its recommendations.
To function independently, the commission must have a sustainable funding mechanism, legislative protections, and institutional autonomy. Adequate financial support is essential for recruiting skilled personnel, investing in modern forensic tools, and conducting thorough investigations. Without sufficient resources, it may struggle to implement reforms, monitor law enforcement agencies, or enforce accountability. Ensuring financial autonomy through a dedicated budget, external funding mechanisms, or legal safeguards is crucial to prevent political interference and operational limitations. A well-resourced commission will be better equipped to fulfil its mandate, strengthen law enforcement accountability, and build public trust in the justice system.
The creation of a police commission raises critical questions about the balance of power between the ministry of home affairs and the police. While the government must retain a degree of control to ensure national security and policy alignment, excessive interference can compromise operational efficiency and fairness. Striking the right balance is crucial. The ministry should retain its authority over broad policy directives, budget allocation, and legislative oversight.
However, operational decisions 鈥� such as criminal investigations, deployment, and disciplinary actions 鈥� should be left to the police commission to ensure impartiality. The commission must have the authority to oversee police appointments, promotions, and disciplinary actions without political interference. It should also have the power to initiate enquiries into misconduct, ensuring that accountability mechanisms remain independent of government control.
To ensure the commission鈥檚 effectiveness, its legal framework must clearly define its powers, functions, and limitations. If structured as a constitutional body, its independence would be more robust. If placed within the constitutional framework but under parliamentary oversight, safeguards must be established to prevent political manipulation. Additionally, the commission should operate transparently, engaging with civil society, human rights organisations, and the judiciary. Public reporting on police performance and accountability measures would help maintain oversight and prevent abuse of power.
The establishment of an independent police commission in Bangladesh is a crucial step toward ensuring accountability, transparency, and efficiency in law enforcement. However, numerous challenges 鈥� including political interference, bureaucratic resistance, financial constraints, and legal loopholes 鈥� pose significant obstacles to its creation and effectiveness. Without strong legal safeguards, financial autonomy, and a transparent appointment process, the commission risks becoming a politically influenced entity rather than an independent oversight body.
Addressing these challenges requires a firm commitment from policymakers, civil society, and the public to push for meaningful reforms. With the right framework, adequate resources, and institutional independence, a well-functioning police commission can enhance public trust, ensure fair policing practices, and uphold the rule of law in Bangladesh.
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Md Motiar Rahman, a retired deputy inspector general of police, works at Anjuman Mufidul Islam.
