IS BANGLADESH ready for a federal system? Emerging听from the recommendation of the Administrative Reforms Commission, the issue has generated considerable discussion. Although federalism has been acknowledged for its capacity to distribute power and solve regional problems elsewhere in the world, its viability in Bangladesh is yet unknown. Examining this proposal through the lens of the nation鈥檚 history, political landscape, and institutional capacity raises critical concerns about whether federalism is a step forward or a recipe for chaos.
As is known, federalism divides political power into three tiers: national, provincial (or state), and local governments, with each level granted specific responsibilities and autonomy. It is a model commonly found in geographically expansive and culturally diverse nations like India, Canada, and the United States. However, smaller countries such as Switzerland and Nepal have also adopted federal structures to manage their internal complexities, showing that federalism is not confined to size or population.
Advocates of federalism argue that it empowers regions to self-govern in alignment with their unique needs, fosters administrative efficiency, preserves cultural diversity, and prevents excessive centralised power. By decentralising authority, federalism enables customised public services, enhances political representation, and ensures responsiveness to local demands. It also encourages policy experimentation at the regional level, leading to innovative solutions that can be adapted nationwide.
But for Bangladesh, the transition to federalism may create structural and administrative bottlenecks that undermine the very benefits of decentralisation. The challenges faced by other South Asian nations, such as Nepal and Pakistan, stand as cautionary tales. Nepal, despite embracing federalism, struggles with weak institutions, ethnic divides, economic disparities, and public mistrust. Pakistan faces problems tied to unresolved ethnic tensions, centralised decision-making, legislative weaknesses, and entrenched corruption. These examples highlight the risks of nations with polarised political structures and fragile institutions attempting a shift to federalism.
Since its independence in 1971, Bangladesh has operated under a unitary system characterised by high centralisation. The dominant role of Dhaka in policy and resource allocation reflects the nation鈥檚 centralised political climate. Political rivalry between the two major parties, the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, has defined 鈥� and divided 鈥� the country鈥檚 governance for decades. A federal system risks amplifying these existing tensions, as competing factions could vie for control of regional power centres, leading to rivalries not only nationally but also provincially.
One of the most pressing concerns is whether Bangladesh鈥檚 institutions are prepared for such a transformative shift. Federalism demands robust frameworks, including state constitutions, distinct legislative assemblies, dedicated civil service systems, and independent machinery at the provincial level. Deploying national bureaucrats to manage regional affairs defeats the purpose of granting autonomy. The fragmentation of authority is likely to exacerbate the inefficiencies, politicisation, and corruption that plague Bangladesh鈥檚 existing political and bureaucratic institutions.
Moreover, Bangladesh鈥檚 relative ethnic and cultural homogeneity compared to countries like Nepal or Pakistan might make federalism unnecessary. However, regional identities do exist, such as the indigenous groups in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHTs) and other areas. The history of the CHTs, where demands for increased autonomy have fuelled tensions with the central government, underlines the fragile nature of regional integration. Federal units with decentralised powers may lead to contentious battles over resources and governance.
Economic disparities between regions further complicate the issue. Resource-rich countries, buoyed by overseas remittances, already command substantial economic clout compared to other underdeveloped regions, such as the southwest or the CHTs. Federalisation could exacerbate economic inequalities, with wealthier provinces monopolising resources and fostering resentment in economically backward regions. Without equitable redistribution mechanisms, such disparities could sow discord, undermining national cohesion.
Federalism also imposes logistical and financial demands that Bangladesh may struggle to meet. To move from a unitary system to a more complex one, a lot of money needs to be spent on building provincial governance structures, making sure that all levels of government work together, creating legal frameworks for sharing resources, and making sure that the national and provincial governments know what their roles are. This process could be mired in inefficiencies and delays, slowing down critical initiatives vital to national progress.
Perhaps most crucially, the risk of fragmentation looms large in a federal model. Dispersion of power risks creating competing political narratives and priorities between central and provincial governments. In extreme scenarios, this could weaken national strategic mechanisms, particularly defence, foreign policy, and border security. Bangladesh鈥檚 geopolitics鈥攎arked by proximity to India, a not-always-friendly neighbour鈥攗nderscores the dangers of fragmented governance. External forces could exploit divisions between provincial governments, leading to vulnerabilities in security and foreign relations.
For example, provinces with autonomous powers might draft independent border policies or demand control over local trade agreements, leading to conflict with national strategies. Divergences between provincial and central governments regarding intelligence-sharing or military budgets could weaken national security鈥攁 critical concern for Bangladesh, given its border challenges and regional dynamics. The constitution ought to delineate with precision the scope of powers assigned to provinces.
Nonetheless, proponents of federalism argue that decentralisation is essential for improving governance, particularly in light of Bangladesh鈥檚 current political climate. The country鈥檚 existing unitary system has failed to adequately address local grievances, with resources and policies disproportionately favouring the nation鈥檚 capital. True decentralisation鈥攚hether achieved through federalism or modifications to the current system鈥攃ould empower local institutions, ensure equitable development, and bridge the gap between Dhaka and the rest of the country.
Therefore, the real lesson for Bangladesh may not be to adopt federalism in its entirety but to implement incremental decentralisation. Strengthening local governments under the existing unitary system, ensuring equitable resource distribution, and fostering stronger institutional transparency represent pragmatic first steps. By allowing regional actors to address their communities鈥� specific needs without dismantling national unity, Bangladesh can test the waters of decentralisation without risking the pitfalls of a federal model.
In the end, federalism is not merely about rewriting a constitution or creating provincial assemblies 鈥� it is about governance maturity, trust among stakeholders, and a clear balance between autonomy and national cohesion. The lesson from other nations is that federalism requires years 鈥� if not decades 鈥� to institutionalise effectively. For Bangladesh, a pragmatic path forward would be to focus on strengthening local institutions under its existing system, promoting participatory democracy, and gradually reducing Dhaka鈥檚 overwhelming grip on governance.
Federalism is indeed a bold idea, but in today鈥檚 Bangladesh, it seems more like an aspiration than an achievable reform. Rather than jumping into an uncertain federal structure, the nation must first prove its ability to strengthen decentralised governance within its existing framework. Only then can the conversation about federalism become more than a theoretical ideal 鈥� it can become a practical reality.
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Dr Habib Zafarullah is an adjunct professor of public policy at the University of New England, Australia, and a former professor of public administration at the University of Dhaka. He is the founding president of the South Asian Network for Public Administration.
