Recommendations of the commission on police administrative reforms lack depth, structural solutions and robust enforcement strategies, writes Md Motiar Rahman
CORRUPTION is deeply rooted, affecting nearly every sector, including law enforcement. Police corruption, marked by bribery, the abuse of power, political interference and extortion, has eroded public trust, weakened the justice system and fostered a culture of impunity. This not only hampers law enforcement but also obstructs justice, fuels social injustice and strengthens criminal networks. Without meaningful reforms, stricter accountability and ethical governance, the police force will remain inefficient and distrusted, undermining efforts to uphold the rule of law and maintain social stability.
Although corruption is widespread across all sectors, the public still expects the police to remain steadfast guardians of integrity. The deposed prime minister Sheikh Hasina once said that even an orderly in the Prime Minister鈥檚 Office had amassed an astonishing amount of Tk 400 crore. While corruption is widely acknowledged, people may not be overly concerned about the immense wealth accumulated by the orderly. However, the public holds justifiable expectations that those entrusted with upholding the law, as its enforcers and guardians, must embody unwavering honesty. Police officers must not only practise integrity but also cultivate trust by being perceived as honest. They should remain accountable to multiple bodies and the people, exemplifying the principles of justice and morality that they are sworn to protect.
The commission on police administrative reforms, established under the interim government, submitted a report. A chapter of the report addresses police corruption, drawing data from Transparency International, Bangladesh reports on corruption. It acknowledges that police corruption is deeply entrenched, manifesting in bribery, the abuse of power, extortion and collusion with criminals. A national survey conducted by Transparency International, Bangladesh identified the police as one of the most corrupt institutions, with its 2022 report saying that 74.4 per cent of law enforcement service recipients encountered corruption. The most corruption-prone areas include arrests (92.8 per cent), traffic-related issues (90.6 per cent), passport verification and police clearance processes (84.4 per cent), FIRs and case-related matters (80 per cent), general diary entries (58.7 per cent) and investigations (55.8 per cent). The figures highlight corruption within the police force鈥檚 institutional activities; unethical practices extend beyond its direct jurisdiction.
The commission鈥檚 report identifies nine sectors of police corruption, five within institutional police activities and four beyond internal police institutions. Bribery and financial misconduct are the most common, with citizens often paying bribes at various stages of legal proceedings. Extortion through threats and torture of the detained in custody is widespread. Recruitment and transfer trades involve significant bribery, with rumours of high payments for police positions. The misuse of power includes false arrests for extortion while traffic police corruption is also prevalent. Beyond institutional misconduct, corruption extends to road and highway extortion, control over illegal street vending and collusion with criminals, including involvement in illicit drug trade, human trafficking and illegal arms smuggling. Some officers detain individuals for ransom, with enforced disappearances and illegal house raids linked to such practices.
The a public opinion survey, 鈥榃hat kind of police do we want?鈥� that the commission conducted found that 84 per cent of respondents have said that they want police free of corruption and unethical practices. The commission could conduct an independent opinion survey, similar to the one by Transparency International, Bangladesh, to assess the types and patterns of corruption within the police. Such a survey would provide first-hand data, offering a more comprehensive understanding of systemic corruption rather than solely relying on the Transparency International, Bangladesh report. While the Transparency International findings are valuable, collating them with an additional survey would enhance credibility, ensure a more nuanced perspective and allow the identification of new trends or overlooked issues. During the peak of kleptocratic state authoritarianism, corruption was not only permitted but systematically encouraged and shielded through political and governance structures. Public sector corruption, especially in public procurement and project execution, worsened as key institutions responsible for combating corruption such as the Anti-Corruption Commission, the law enforcement agencies and the judiciary were politicised and rendered ineffective.
Moreover, the survey could show clearly that police officers who are associated with all these services are involved in corruption. However, the vast majority of the force has limited or no involvement in such practices. This approach would also help policymakers and the law enforcement agencies to design more effective, evidence-based reforms to combat corruption and improve accountability within the police force.
The reforms commission proposes an 鈥榓ll-party committee鈥� and a special task force to enhance transparency and combat police corruption. However, these measures face challenges such as politicisation, the conflicts of interest and undue influence over law enforcement. Ensuring neutrality in a politically charged environment would be difficult.
While a special task force could enforce accountability, its success depends on political will, independence and a strong legal mandate. Effective anti-corruption efforts require institutional reforms, strict enforcement mechanisms and whistleblower protection rather than relying solely on external committees. Transparency, non-partisanship and strong legal backing are essential for meaningful reforms.
The report highlights the presence of bribery in the recruitment process, particularly in the selection of constables and sub-inspectors/sergeants. While the police assert that they have implemented digital recruitment platforms featuring transparent selection criteria, automated screening and standardised evaluations to minimise human interference and manipulation, political influence persists just before the viva voce stage. The reforms commission has failed to detect this subtle political intervention. Additionally, the recruitment board for sub-inspectors and sergeants includes senior officials from the home affairs ministry.
The practice of police officers paying bribes for desirable postings and transfers is an open secret, deeply embedded in the bureaucratic and political landscape. Officers at various levels, from constables to ranking officials, often engage in unofficial financial transactions or leverage political connections to secure postings in lucrative or strategically advantageous locations. These sought-after positions, typically in urban areas or regions with significant commercial activity, provide opportunities for career advancement, financial benefits or enhanced influence. This corrupt system is fuelled by a network of intermediaries, including senior officials, politicians and brokers, who facilitate these transactions in exchange for monetary gains or reciprocal favours.
Similarly, the lack of a merit-based promotion system within the police force fosters a culture of corruption as officers who secure promotions through bribery or political influence often feel compelled to recover their financial investments through illicit means. Instead of being rewarded for competence, integrity and service, promotion frequently depends on personal connections, lobbying and the ability to pay substantial sums to influential figures within the administration or political circles. Corruption demoralises honest officers and creates a vicious cycle, where higher officials resort to extortion and bribery to sustain their power. This leads to institutionalised corruption, weakening accountability and public trust in law enforcement. The system discourages professionalism and ethics, ultimately compromising the police force鈥檚 effectiveness and credibility in maintaining law and order.
The commission has failed to recommend replacing the politicised and bribe-driven hiring system with an independent and transparent recruitment authority within its recruitment structure. Notably, its proposals do not include the establishment of an independent police service commission to oversee hiring and promotion nor do they advocate for a performance-based evaluation system to reduce officer鈥檚 reliance on bribery for career advancement. To address these critical issues, a fully autonomous police service commission should be created to ensure that recruitment and promotion are based on merit, rather than financial transactions or political influence. Furthermore, implementing a performance-based promotion system would incentivise professionalism, integrity and accountability within the force. By integrating these reforms, the law enforcement agencies could foster a fair and transparent system, ultimately winning public trust and enhancing overall efficiency in maintaining law and order.
The report has not addressed the issues of posting, transfer and promotion at mid-level and senior ranks done by the ministries. In practice, officers must demonstrate allegiance to the ruling political government, with their backgrounds vetted to ensure alignment with the party in power. Those who fail to meet these expectations are often relegated to less significant roles, hindering their career progression. Additionally, some officers secure promotion, postings and transfers through financial transactions. In such cases, the police headquarters functions merely as a conduit, forwarding proposals to the relevant ministry. These proposals then navigate an extensive bureaucratic process before receiving the highly sought-after endorsement: 鈥楤y the order of the Honourable President鈥�, ostensibly for the sake of public interests. The file then makes its way back through the ministry in a similar manner for the issuance of the government order.
The exchange, whether in cash or kind, takes place either at the beginning or the end of the deal. A portion of the funds that remain in Bangladesh is legitimised as white money by the end of the financial year, allowing for legal investment in various sectors to generate surplus value.
The remaining portion moves through various channels before ultimately being loaded onto the digital minstrel, Skylark. It then ascends higher and higher, never looking back, eventually crossing Bangladesh鈥檚 borders and reaching its final destinations 鈥� Begum Para in Canada, the United States, Australia, Dubai, Malaysia鈥檚 second home programme and, even, India.
Within the ministry, officials serve as both facilitators and beneficiaries of these transactions, acting as honest brokers in a well-entrenched nexus between civil bureaucrats and politicians. The commission has, however, failed to unravel this intricate web of corruption.
The commission acknowledges political influence as a key factor in police corruption but fails to propose strong safeguards against political pressure. Politically motivated appointment prioritises loyalty over merit, fostering corrupt alliances and undermining impartial law enforcement. The report lacks recommendations for a depoliticised appointment process to ensure professionalism and integrity in leadership.
Additionally, the police are often used for political repression, including arbitrary arrest, enforced disappearances and the suppression of opposition activists. Despite having recognised these issues, the report does not suggest legal safeguards to prevent such abuses. The lack of operational independence leaves the police vulnerable to external manipulation, allowing crimes by ruling party affiliates to go unchecked. Without clear autonomy mechanisms, public trust and law enforcement integrity remain compromised.
An effective solution to safeguard police operations from political influence is the establishment of a legally mandated independent police authority, ensuring impartiality and professionalism. Criminalising the political misuse of law enforcement and enforcing accountability would deter partisan manipulation. Additionally, parliamentary oversight through an independent committee could enhance transparency and maintain law enforcement鈥檚 focus on justice and public service. While police oversight is crucial for monitoring corruption, the commission has failed to strongly advocate for it, with only a student representative pushing for an independent police commission. The police headquarters supported a framework aligned with the 2007 draft police ordinance, but the home affairs ministry opposed it, highlighting conflicting views. Despite unanimous endorsement of an oversight body, the commission has avoided taking a firm stance on whether it should be statutory or constitutional, seemingly delaying action due to political complexities and resistance. Furthermore, the report overlooks the implementation of technology dashboard cameras, or GPS tracking, which could enhance transparency and prevent the abuse of power.
The report highlights custodial torture as a tool for extortion but lacks strong legal proposals to criminalise it. Illegal detentions persist due to weak penalties, allowing the police to demand bribes without fear of consequences. It also fails to address extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, often used for ransom, later disguised as 鈥榚ncounters鈥� without independent verification. The absence of forensic oversight and weak accountability mechanisms protect corrupt officers.
To combat these abuses, strict legal penalties, an independent judiciary and witness protection are necessary. Establishing independent forensic oversight units and mandatory digital recording in interrogation rooms can enhance transparency. However, success depends on political will, institutional independence and a cultural shift within law enforcement to uphold accountability and human rights.
The report acknowledges widespread bribery and financial corruption in the police force but lacks concrete measures to prevent illicit wealth accumulation. It fails to mandate asset disclosure, allowing corrupt officers to hide unexplained wealth and evade accountability. The absence of stringent financial oversight further enables misconduct, eroding public trust.
Additionally, the report overlooks procurement fraud, where corruption inflates costs for essential resources due to the lack of an e-procurement system. Traffic police bribery, affecting 90.6 per cent of cases, remains inadequately addressed, missing solutions like cashless fine collection and AI-driven surveillance to reduce officer-motorist interaction.
Even where the commission puts forward some recommendations, its failure to establish a clear timeline for implementation significantly undermines their potential impact. Without defined deadlines, proposed reforms can be indefinitely delayed or entirely ignored, allowing corruption to persist unchecked. A well-structured reform process requires phased implementation with measurable milestones, yet the report lacks any such road maps. This omission makes it easier for authorities to evade responsibility and for corrupt practices to continue without meaningful intervention. In the absence of a concrete action plan, even the most well-intentioned recommendations risk becoming empty promises rather than enforceable policies.
Additionally, the report does not address the critical issue of funding for anti-corruption initiatives or oversight by the Anti-Corruption Commission with leaving doubts about how proposed measures will be financially sustained. Meaningful reforms such as improved oversight and technological interventions require dedicated financial resources, yet the report fails to outline how such efforts will be financed. Furthermore, tackling police corruption demands a coordinated effort involving law enforcement agencies, the judiciary, the Anti-Corruption Commission and civil society. However, the report does not propose any framework for inter-agency collaboration, leaving reform efforts fragmented and ineffective. Without financial backing and a structured approach to coordination, the commission鈥檚 recommendations remain largely aspirational rather than actionable solutions to police corruption.
The commission鈥檚 report provides a sketchy analysis of corruption within the police and its recommendations lack depth, structural solutions and robust enforcement strategies. To effectively combat corruption, the authorities must adopt a multi-pronged approach that includes independent oversight bodies to investigate police misconduct, a depoliticised police service commission to regulate hiring, transfers and promotion and harsh penalties for custodial torture, bribery and procurement fraud. Additionally, mandatory digital transparency tools such as body cameras and online complaint systems should be implemented, along with a clear and time-bound strategy for enforcement. Without these comprehensive measures, police corruption will continue to erode public trust, undermine justice and perpetuate systemic impunity.
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Dr Md Motiar Rahman is a retired deputy inspector general of police.
