MONGLA Port, the second oldest and the second largest sea port of Bangladesh, has been in operation since 1954. A British commercial ship, the City Lyons, dropped anchor in the River Pussur on December 11, 1950, marking the beginning of the port. The port formally started operation as Chalna Port in 1951. The port was later relocated to its present place in 1954. The Chalna Port Authority was established as an autonomous body in 1976 and it was renamed as the Mongla Port Authority in 1987.
Since 1954, the port has significantly facilitated Bangladesh鈥檚 maritime trade. Throughout the 1990s, the port had downturn because of various reasons. It started to recover in the 2010s. In 2020鈥�2021, the port authorities handled 1,708 ships compared with 492 in 2014鈥�2015. The authorities handled 43,959 TEUs of containers in 2020鈥�2021 and 42,137 TEUs in 2014鈥�2015. In 2020鈥�2021, the port handled 11,944,608 tonnes of cargo which was 4,530,279 tonnes in 2014鈥�2015. The port also handled 14,474 imported vehicles in 2020鈥�2021 and 11,218 vehicles in 2014鈥�2015.
During the same period, then ship turnaround time improved. The average turnaround time in 2020鈥�2021 was 4.12 compared to 4.45 in 2014鈥�2015. In this period, the highest turnaround time was 5.21 in 2017鈥�2018. In 2020鈥�2021, the authorities made an operating profit of Tk 1,300 million (provisional). The examination of operating performance indicators shows that the efficiency of the authorities has improved significantly and the graph shows an upward trend. The authorities have also made an investment plan of Tk 27.50 billion in the development of the infrastructure associated with port鈥檚 operation.
While the authorities are progressing, Indian media outlets reported on India鈥檚 willingness to take over the operational control of the Port. According to Logisticsinsider.in online (June 11, 2024), a delegation from India Ports Global Limited visited Mongla Port in May 2024, assessed operational facilities, gave a proposal to the Mongla Port Authority for an evaluation of profitability and forward to the government for final decision. Seatradenews.com reported on June 1, 2024 that a senior official of the port authorities confirmed that the IPGL delegation visited Mongla Port and 鈥榚xpressed interest to be involved in port operations.鈥�
Bangladesh has given India transshipment access to both Chittagong Port and Mongla Port which has cut India鈥檚 1,650 kilometres of overland route through the Siliguri Corridor to almost a tenth. How has the transshipment access benefitted Bangladesh? According to a newspaper report published on April 26, 2023, India will pay Tk 220 per tonne of cargo in transshipment fee, security and administrative charge plus Tk 30 per consignment in processing fee, Tk 254 in container scanning fee and Tk 85 a kilometre in escort charge.
Is the tariff reasonable and how frequently will it be reviewed? Has transshipment access to Nepal and Bhutan through the Siliguri Corridor been obtained? Could Bangladesh secure legitimate share of waters of common rivers? The answers are an open secret.
Bangladesh has given India diverse connectivity by sea/river, air and land. On the other hand, India continues to deny Bangladesh transshipment access to the Siliguri Corridor to connect Bangladesh with Bhutan and Nepal and its legitimate share of water of the common rivers. Bangladeshi negotiators seemed to take defensive position to accommodate friendly demands.
Indian media mentioned two geopolitical reasons for the proposal on Mongla Port. One, China seeks influence in the strategically located port. Other reason is India鈥檚 strategic ambitions in the Bay of Bengal and its potential rivalry with China for influence in the region. India has its own interests to lock the control of Mongla Port鈥檚 operations management. Bangladesh should do the due diligence to weigh own benefits before giving up the operational control of Mongla Port.
India has accessed the management of Chabahar Port in Iran and Sittwe Port in Myanmar鈥檚 Rakhine State. Iran and Myanmar have different geopolitical contexts to outsource the management of their respective ports. Iran has been under western sanction since 1979. Iran needs investment and international business. Small countries have limitations to trade with Iran. Major economies such as China, Russia, Japan, India, etc can withstand western pressure for engaging Iran. India also needed a port to trade with the land-locked Afghanistan and, importantly, maintain presence beside the Gwadar Port in Pakistan, the seaward terminal point in the China Pakistan Economic Corridor. Iran has allowed India to oversee the management of two terminals, not the management of the whole Chabahar Port.
Sittwe Port at the confluence of the River Kaladan is neither a deep-sea port nor a major sea port in Myanmar. International shipping does not call on Sittwe Port. This small port is part of India鈥檚 Kaladan multimodal transport transit project to connect Kolkata and Mizoram via Sittwe and Paletwa in Myanmar.
According to a report of the Observer Research Foundation online (April 25, 2024), India has a 鈥榗omplete control over the Sittwe Port and treat it like other [Indian] domestic ports.鈥� The port will handle mostly coastal trade of India-Myanmar and Bangladesh-Myanmar. Given the degree of control awarded by Myanmar, India, besides moving commercial goods, is likely to have the scope to transport military goods to its north-eastern region during peace time and also in the event of any internal and border conflict in the north-eastern region. On the other hand, Myanmar needed India as a counter weight to China鈥檚 grip on Myanmar.
Both China and India have investment proposals with Mongla Port. China has government-to-government proposal involving Tk 450 million crore to construct jetty, cargo yards and a couple of other infrastructure. India has placed Tk 600 million plus line of credit to construct jetty, bungalow, a bridge over Mongla Nala, a car yard and road. As far it is known, China has not yet expressed its intention to take over operational control of Mongla Port, but India has expressed its willingness to take full control of the port management.
Indian media has been obsessed with China鈥檚 investments in Bangladesh. In the 1990s, a Chinese company constructed New Mooring Container Terminal at Chittagong Port. An Indian think tank dubbed this terminal as a pearl in the China鈥檚 String of Pearl although it is owned and operated by the Chittagong Port Authority. The Bangladesh navy commissioned the BNS Sheikh Hasina,听 the lone submarine base, at Maheskhali in 2023 where Indian media invented Chinese footprint and facilities to dock Chinese navy ships.
Mongla Port does not have the geo-strategic distinction in its typical sense because of its unstable hydrological conditions and geo-physical location. It will not give India any strategic leverage over China in the region. Rather, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Lakshadweep and the under-construction military base on the Agalega Island in the Indian Ocean, a dependency of Mauritius, provides the strategic values to counter Chinese movement in the region.
Then, India has Sittwe Port close to Chinese multi-billion dollar investment projects, China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and large naval infrastructures having the potential to dock Chinese ships. Mongla Port does not have similar situational background. Therefore, the principal objective of regulating the Mongla Port seems to hold the full control of the transshipment route and cargo from point of origin to the point of destination (Mongla Port to destinations in India鈥檚 north-easten region and West Bengal and vice versa). Then, how does it benefit Bangladesh?
Mongla Port is neither a desolate port facility nor inefficiently managed by Bangladesh authorities. The port does not have the geopolitical context like Chabahar Port or Sittwe Port. Then, what could be the good reason for Bangladesh to consider giving the control of Mongla Port management to India or any other country? None, for now.
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Mohammad Abdur Razzak (safera690@yahoo), a retired commodore of the Bangladesh navy, is a security analyst.