IN THE inundated parts of Bangladesh and north-east India, at least 36 people have died as rivers on both sides of the border reached extreme levels a few days ago. Nearly 4.5 million people have been affected by the flooding in Bangladesh, which has forced hundreds of houses under water, leaving residents stranded on rooftops. At least, 13 people have died in the flooding and more than 200,000 people have been evacuated from flooded areas in Bangladesh. Recent reports inform us that the water of the rivers in the north-east, the east, and the south-east is receding, giving hints that the flood situation is gradually improving.
Strong anti-India sentiments have prevailed in Bangladesh mainly because of India鈥檚 unambiguous support for Sheikh Hasina to hold on to power by any means necessary, along with other irritants in bilateral relations that include but are not limited to the water sharing of the 54 common rivers between India and Bangladesh. Members of the Bangladesh interim government, students, and other quarters have rightly voiced their displeasure and protested mainly for not informing Bangladesh of the dam opening that caused Bangladesh to suffer devastating flood. India brushed aside claims that water release from the Tripura dam caused flooding in Bangladesh, citing heavy rainfall as the cause.
In South Asia, water is among the most politically contested issue. The region is facing water shortage and agricultural difficulties. The region undergoing rapid industrialisation will continue to face increasing demands on energy and water. The over-extraction of groundwater is of particular concern in the region. More than 23 million pumps are used across Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and Pakistan to extract groundwater for various purposes. Salinity and other sorts of contamination affect over 60 per cent of groundwater in the Indo-Gangetic plain. The impact of climate change is also changing the water flow patterns and reducing the amount of water in the Brahmaputra basin. An increasing need for power and stable water levels could and should compel the reconsideration of bilateral water-sharing treaties.
Sharing the waters of the Teesta is the most contentious between India and Bangladesh. Bangladesh has sought an equitable distribution of Teesta waters via the Ganga Water Treaty 1996, but to no avail. Teesta remains an unfinished project, as individual states significantly influence trans-boundary agreements in India. The Indo-Bangladesh water sharing treaty鈥檚 30-year term ends in 2026. The deposed prime minister Sheikh Hasina and her government were trying to negotiate the agreement renewal with India in 2026. Given the current flood situation and changing regional and bilateral relations dynamics instigated by the political change in Bangladesh, the interim government of Bangladesh needs to consider other options in tandem with bilateral ones that have been mainly ineffective or, at best, skewed in favour of India.
The Joint Rivers Commission has largely failed to resolve trans-boundary rivers鈥� water-sharing issues. It is primarily because of a lack of commitment from India and Bangladesh鈥檚 technical and likely diplomatic and strategic incapacity to be persuasive. Given Bangladesh鈥檚 ongoing political transformation, there is a need to recalibrate the country鈥檚 outlook on foreign relations. This does not mean that the country should reconsider the principles of foreign policy embedded in its constitution. Those are remarkably liberal and commendable compared with that of any country. However, there needs to be a recalibration of how this foreign policy is exercised with Bangladesh鈥檚 national and regional interests at the core rather than political considerations. With the interim government now in place, this is the perfect opportunity for Bangladesh to exercise the said foreign policy approach.
The chief adviser to the interim government Muhammad Yunus has shared the idea of jointly developing a high-level mechanism between Bangladesh and India to tackle emergencies like floods. While bilateral approaches should continue to be pursued, they should not be Bangladesh鈥檚 only recourse. India鈥檚 insistence on resolving issues bilaterally has not been fruitful for Bangladesh.
Bangladesh must consider and pursue a third-party involvement in resolving water-sharing issues and trans-boundary river management with India. There are already prime examples and templates for doing so within the vicinity, in fact, examples that involve India. India and Pakistan signed the World Bank-brokered Indus Waters Treaty on September 19, 1960. The treaty delimited the obligations and rights of both countries regarding the use of the waters of the Indus River system.
The Indus Waters Treaty is among the oldest confidence-building measures. It is regarded as one of the most successful global trans-boundary water-sharing treaties and an enduring bilateral confidence-building measure. It has survived several wars and crises, unlike many other confidence-building measures. Unfortunately, India and Pakistan continue to exploit the basin without considering the impact on the climate as its threat continues to increase the propensity for resource-based conflict in South Asia. There is a robust dispute settlement mechanism within the Indus Waters Treaty. The treaty鈥檚 implementation faces problems and challenges, but the dispute settlement mechanism offers effective recourse for acceptable resolutions. Bangladesh must consider installing a similar treaty based on such dispute settlement mechanisms.
Moreover, the treaty should continuously focus on insulating it from domestic pressure threatening to politicise it. This is something that both India and Pakistan should focus on for the Indus treaty. The treaty gave the waters of three western rivers to Pakistan and those of the eastern rivers to India. If that is any point of reference for future resolutions between India and Bangladesh, it must be iterated that the two countries have 54 common rivers.
The International Water Law also provides an underlying legal framework that enables countries to cooperate peacefully and use water resources to maximise shared socio-economic and environmental benefits. The International Water Law comprises international treaties, bilateral and multilateral basin agreements, and principles. International law provides several mechanisms and procedures to avoid or settle water disputes. Several universal principles governing the use of shared waters are essential for the law, including a principle of reasonable and equitable use, the obligation not to inflict significant harm and the duty to cooperate and protect ecological systems. These are necessary for any water-sharing mechanisms for India and Bangladesh, which are grave victims of climate change and face significant environmental challenges. Bangladesh must pursue international mechanisms as the interim government adviser for the environment, as has been alluded to recently. Bangladesh must also pursue domestic solutions to any issues and problems that arise due to non-resolution and difficulties that Bangladesh faces because it is situated downstream in the India-Bangladesh river dichotomy. India鈥檚 intransigence compelled Bangladesh to consider a Chinese proposal to embank large portions of the River Teesta and dredge the riverbed so that it formed a single manageable channel. The proposal was reportedly shelved because India opposed the project as it is reluctant to have Chinese technicians near the chicken neck corridor near Siliguri. Bangladesh and China relations are also deeply founded on economic relations. Bangladesh must continue to consider and pursue these options and those mentioned above.
In the course of pursuing the above recommendations, it is in no way suggested that Bangladesh should redefine its relations with India. The historical relations and connectivity between the two countries are true and will remain a reality in future interactions and relations. The geopolitical, geostrategic, geoeconomic, regional and bilateral relations are a reality for Bangladesh that it can never ignore. However, the historical political considerations that have dictated Bangladesh鈥檚 approach to this relation must be recalibrated and overlooked. The recommended approach would have been a real challenge, but not so much with a non-political interim government in place now. With all the reforms that the people, along with the international, expect from this government, the recalibration with all global and regional actors pivoted on regional realities and national interests must be part of the effort in the coming days.
In early 2024, a public event comprising river experts underscored that there is an upstream and downstream dynamic in any water agreement. Upstream countries often see no direct reason to agree, as they do not immediately face consequences unless compelled by other factors. These other factors remained overlooked and inactive with India because of political interests, a situation that can be effectively changed with the interim government in power. This instigated the current realities that Bangladesh faces now with flood-induced devastation.
In conclusion, it must be underscored that the denial of culpability in India is likely to be true in the current flood. Some experts in Bangladesh have recently alluded to the fact that excessive rains, as claimed by India, are the likely cause of the flood that has also affected Indian territories. Faults also remain with Bangladesh鈥檚 meteorologists鈥� inability to predict the excessive rainfall and India not communicating about the dam鈥檚 gates opening. All those issues considered, it also cannot be denied that India鈥檚 advantageous position in the upstream of the river dichotomy, political and security advantages acquired from the previous regime and the skewed benefit that it has reaped from the water-sharing treaties in their current format, India has approached chiefly this issue that makes Bangladesh stand on the losing end of an apparent a zero-sum approach. With the anti-India sentiment becoming so apparent in the transformational period that Bangladesh is undergoing, India must realise that the closest of allies would not wait in perpetuity to sign a deal and agreement but would, instead, look for other alternatives.
India should realise and Bangladesh must point out to Delhi the strategic partnership and mutual strategic and regional necessities that both the countries offer each other. India has been a gracious ally during our liberation war, but Bangladesh has also been an overtly gracious partner and neighbour for the last two decades. Bangladesh鈥檚 gesture to allow India to draw water from the River Feni purely on humanitarian grounds is one example that must be acknowledged. If India resolves the water-sharing issues with Bangladesh, it will be a positive signal to all within the Bangladeshi society. It will assuage fears that exist in the minds of average Bangladeshi about India鈥檚 intentions.
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Simon Mohsin is a political and international affairs analyst.