THE departure of the deposed prime minister Sheikh Hasina to India on August 5 against the backdrop of the student protests for civil service quota reform causing the murder of several hundred people has triggered the relations between Bangladesh and India for another paradigm shift. Although Hasina sought and obtained political asylum after the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Haina鈥檚 taking refuge in India now raises apprehensions of strained bilateral relations. Despite the foundation laid by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman for strong bilateral ties with India, recent years have sparked debates over whether this relationship has been mutually beneficial or skewed in favour of one side.
Since 1971. Bangladesh-India ties have witnessed ups and downs on a myriad of issues. In early 1972, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman succeeded in getting withdrawn Indian troops from Bangladesh. Shortly after, the India-Bangladesh Treaty of Friendship was signed and in 1974, the Land Boundary Agreement was made, which was later revised in 2015 to exchange enclaves, resulting in India ceding about 40 square kilometers to Bangladesh.
The Awami League鈥檚 return to power in 1996, 21 years after losing it in August 1975, marked the beginning of Hasina鈥檚 vision for mutually beneficial relations between Bangladesh and India. During her administration in 1996鈥�2001, Hasina persuaded New Delhi to finalise the Ganges water-sharing agreement, which had earlier been delayed by more than two decades. However, her party鈥檚 defeat to the Bangladesh Nationalist Party in 2001 interrupted her efforts to secure further water-sharing agreements on other rivers shared by both the countries and to elevate bilateral relations to a new level.
In 2013, India and Bangladesh signed an extradition treaty, which was revised in 2016 to ease and accelerate the process of exchanging fugitives between the two nations. Anup Chetia, a prominent figure from the United Liberation Front of Asom, was deported from Bangladesh to India. Chetia, who had been living in Bangladesh for years, was handed over to Indian authorities as part of the extradition agreement. This cooperation has contributed to some degrees of regional stability mostly in favour of India.
To ensure a fair water sharing of 54 transboundary rivers between Bangladesh and India, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Indira Gandhi formed the Joint River Commission on March 19, 1972. Since the commission鈥檚 formation, only one water-sharing agreement, concerning the Ganges, was signed in 1996 and it is set to expire in 2026. Despite the commission鈥檚 principles, India has constructed numerous dams that hinder the normal flow of water into Bangladesh, particularly during the dry season.
Conversely, when these dams are opened during the monsoon season, they cause catastrophic flooding in Bangladesh, as was reportedly the case recently when the opening of the Dumboor dam without warning led to severe flooding in Feni, Cumilla, Noakhali, Lakshmipur and Chittagong. Other dams, such as those on the Farakka and Ganges rivers, have similarly caused significant harm to Bangladesh, including the loss of life, drought, riverbank erosion, crop destruction, health issues and economic challenges.
In terms of trade, although Bangladesh is reportedly India鈥檚 largest trading partner in South Asia and it enjoys a duty-free market access for its exportable goods, various obstacles remain. Non-tariff and para-tariff barriers such as anti-dumping duties on jute products, hydrogen peroxide and new customs rules of origin hinder the expansion of Bangladesh鈥檚 exports to India. Moreover, Bangladesh鈥檚 trade deficit with India continues to widen each year. For instance, in the 2021鈥�2022 financial year, Bangladesh imported goods worth $14.58 billion from India while its exports to India amounted to only $1.8 billion. This imbalance is indicative of India鈥檚 substantial trade surplus with Bangladesh.
Despite the so-called cordial political ties with India during the Awami League regime, the situation at the border has remained tense, and often violent, over the past decades. The notorious incident occurred on January 7, 2011, when the body of a 14-year-old girl was left hanging on the barbed-wire fence in the frontiers. Following this, both the countries pledged to work towards zero border killing. However, this commitment has not been honoured by the India鈥檚 Border Security Force.
According to rights organisation Ain O Salish Kendra, India鈥檚 Border Security Force is said to have killed 332 people near the Bangladesh-India border in 2013鈥�2023, averaging 30 deaths per year. These killings, along with widespread smuggling activities involving weapons, drugs, livestocks and other contraband items, raise serious concerns about the use of lethal force against alleged traffickers. Innocent people have often been shot or abducted by the Indian force in clear violation of both legal and moral standards. Additionally, reports of torture by the Indian guards have surfaced, involving various forms of physical abuse such as shooting, beating and mutilation as well as more extreme acts like burning, maiming and even rape.
India鈥檚 involvement in Bangladesh鈥檚 energy sector has also raised concern. Bangladesh imports 1,160MW of electricity from India. However, the Rampal power project, a joint venture between the Bangladesh Power Development Board and India鈥檚 National Thermal Power Corporation, has faced opposition and criticism because of its potential environmental impact on the Sunderbans. Despite public and environmental concerns, the government remains committed to the project, raising questions about the balance between environmental protection and foreign investment security.
Additionally, Bangladesh has committed to buying 1,496MW of electricity from Adani Power Ltd for 25 years under a contract signed in 2017. This agreement is under serious scrutiny for adding to Bangladesh鈥檚 rising power prices, with electricity from the Adani coal power plant costing nearly twice the cost of power bought on India鈥檚 energy exchange market. As a result, Adani has become the largest beneficiary of India鈥檚 power export to Bangladesh, with its share of the export bill exceeding $1 billion. The Adani project is reckoned to be a persuasive measure by Dhaka to gain Delhi鈥檚 endorsement of the alleged rigged election of 2018.
Allowing a foreign country to use a nation鈥檚 transport infrastructure for transit can be seen as a compromise of national sovereignty, especially if the terms of the agreement are minimal or inadequately compensated. For instance, Bangladesh allowed India to use its transport corridors with a minimal fee. Originally, a core committee proposed a transit fee of Tk 1,058 per tonne. However, the government later agreed to a much lower fee of Tk 192 per tonne, with Tk 130 allocated to customs, Tk 52 to Roads and Highways, and Tk 10 to the Inland Water Transport Authority. This situation can weaken national control over infrastructure and economic interests, potentially allowing foreign entities to exploit resources or routes without sufficient benefits or protections for the host country.
The recent Bangladesh-India Railway Transit Agreement, signed during Sheikh Hasina鈥檚 tenure, has also sparked widespread criticism among Bangladeshis. The agreement outlines a 1,275-kilometre railway route connecting Bangladesh, Nepal and India, with 861 kilometres passing through Bangladesh. Controversy has arisen because of concerns that the agreement permits regular access to Bangladesh for Indian security personnel, potentially compromising the nation鈥檚 intelligence and security infrastructure. Through this project, India aims to establish a more secure route to its northeastern states, bypassing the vulnerable chicken鈥檚 neck corridor.
Accordingly, China conducted a feasibility study and expressed interest in the Teesta river project, but Sheikh Hasina favored India鈥檚 leadership to secure Bangladesh鈥檚 access to water sources upstream. However, instead of advancing with China鈥檚 proposal, Hasina leaned towards India鈥檚 involvement, following an offer of financial support from the Indian foreign secretary. This decision has sparked tension between India, China and Bangladesh, raising concern about foreign relations and regional cooperation.
India鈥檚 significant role in Bangladesh鈥檚 liberation war, although driven by its own national interests, does not justify Bangladesh being treated as a vassal state. India must respect Bangladesh鈥檚 sovereignty and uphold proper diplomatic nicety. The saying 鈥榦ne cannot choose one鈥檚 brothers and neighbors鈥� applies to all as India lacks friendly relations with its neighbours. Therefore, India should refrain from interfering in internal and external affairs of its neighboring countries or it may face harsh consequences. As then chief adviser to the interim government Muhammad Yunus said that an unstable Bangladesh could have widespread repercussions across the region, including Myanmar, India鈥檚 north-eastern states and West Bengal.
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Mahmudur Rahman Saidy and Nowshin Islam are lecturers in public administration in the University of Chittagong.