The fault lines of Bengali nationalism, as shaped, branded and exploited by the Awami League, reflect its evolution from a unifying force into a tool for political control writes Tanbir Uddin Arman
IN HIS incisive essay ‘Notes on Nationalism’, British novelist and poet George Orwell astutely remarked that nationalism often manifests as power hunger tempered by self-deception. This observation finds a striking parallel in the Awami League’s narrow, distorted narrative of Bengali nationalism. The party’s appropriation of Bengali nationalism — particularly its monopolisation of the Liberation War history and the ‘Spirit of 1971’ — functioned as both a veil and a weapon, shrouding its political interests in the guise of nationalism. It was a cunning manoeuvre, where self-deception entwines with political manipulation while sidelining the broader, more inclusive values of nationalism and secularism. Time and again, leaders of the party invoked the essence of Bengali nationalism and the ‘Spirit of 1971’, painting themselves as the sole guardians of Bangladesh’s independence and identity. Beneath this façade lies a troubling narrative of exclusion and division.
The Awami League created a peculiar version of nationalism that was used to fortify its grip on power and delegitimise its political opponents, portraying them as anti-national forces. This tactic aligns with Orwell’s notion of nationalism as a mechanism for self-justified power. The party tactfully equated loyalty to it with loyalty to the nation itself. By branding its opponents as traitors to the country’s independence, the Awami League used nationalism as a cover for authoritarian practices. Crackdowns on freedom of speech, the use of draconian laws like the Digital Security Act to silence critics, and the persecution of political rivals were all justified by accusing opponents and critics of working against the ‘Spirit of 1971.’
This suppression of opposition in the name of nationalism reflects a deeper form of self-deception, where the Awami League conflated its political benefits with national interest. During elections and political crises, the party was often seen framing votes for opposition parties as threats to the nation’s sovereignty. They did it on purpose to imply that only the party can protect the spirit of independence. This manipulation of nationalist sentiment consolidated power while suppressing dissent.
Orwell’s phrase ‘tempered by self-deception’ highlights how nationalism can blind its adherents to the true nature of their actions, as they believe they are acting in the interest of the nation while actually pursuing self-serving goals. The Awami League’s distortion of Bengali nationalism reflects this self-deception in several ways. The party presented itself as the champion of secularism, democracy, and Bengali nationalism, but it selectively abandoned or compromised these principles for political expediency. They claimed to uphold secularism, a core element of Bengali nationalism, but they frequently allied with Islamist groups like Hefazat-e-Islam to shore up political support. The removal of the Lady Justice statue from the Supreme Court premises in 2017, influenced by Islamist pressure, also revealed a self-deception within the party — publicly championing secular nationalism while privately compromising with religious groups for political gains.
The fault lines of Bengali nationalism, as shaped, branded and exploited by the Awami League, reflect its evolution from a unifying force into a tool for political control. Historically, Bengali nationalism, under the country’s founding president, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, emerged as a powerful mobilising force against West Pakistan’s political, economic and cultural dominance. It emphasised linguistic pride, particularly the recognition of Bangla as a national language, which was central to the 1952 Language Movement. The struggle culminated in the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971, with Sheikh Mujib’s charismatic leadership garnering massive support from the populace. Post-independence, however, the establishment of BAKSAL (Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League) — a one-party system — by the Mujib government in 1975 alienated many political elites and the public, undermining the pluralistic aspirations of Bengali nationalism. This shift marked the first major fault line of Bengali nationalism.
After Sheikh Mujib’s assassination, his daughter, Sheikh Hasina, reasserted the Awami League’s claim over Bengali nationalism. Hasina and her party, the Awami League, adopted a narrower interpretation of Bengali nationalism centred around the branding of the legacy of Sheikh Mujib while suppressing alternative nationalist voices, including those from the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and the leftist movements. Celebrations such as ‘Mujib Year’ and the mushrooming of Sheikh Mujib’s statues symbolised a personality cult that stifled political pluralism. Critics repeatedly warned that this monolithic view of history and nationalism would promote a selective, exclusionary version of national identity.
Hasina applied Bengali nationalism as a tool to justify her party’s authoritarian measures. The controversial national elections in 2014, 2018 and 2024 were marred by widespread allegations of vote rigging and violence against opposition parties. Yet, the Awami League framed these actions as necessary to protect the ideals of the liberation war. This resulted in a deep democratic deficit. Furthermore, Hasina and her regime aggressively controlled the historical narrative of Bangladesh’s liberation, often discrediting the contributions of other leaders, including the BNP’s founder, president Ziaur Rahman. The war crimes trials, initially aimed at accountability, were widely criticised as a politically motivated mission to eliminate rivals rather than genuine pursuits of justice.
The use and distortion of nationalism for political ends is a strategy employed by many political parties across the world. In India, prime minister Narendra Modi’s BJP has been accused of distorting nationalism by equating Indian identity with Hindu identity. The party is often criticised for invoking ‘Hindutva’ (Hindu nationalism) as a way to galvanise support from the majority Hindu population. Modi’s speeches, too, tie India’s pride and heritage to a Hindu-centric identity, which helps him consolidate political support by stoking a nationalist sentiment. This version of nationalism marginalises India’s Muslim, Sikh and other minority communities and is used as a political tool to justify exclusionary policies, such as the controversial Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA). The Awami League also manipulated anti-Pakistan sentiment to secure political favour from Pakistan’s rival India. Hasina’s government utilised these sentiments to deflect from domestic criticism, branding a narrow definition of national identity.
Another glaring flaw in the Awami League’s interpretation of Bengali nationalism is its exclusionary stance towards ethnic groups such as the Chakmas, Garos, Marmas and Santals, who do not identify with the dominant Bengali cultural identity. This state-sponsored, narrow version of nationalism marginalised the non-Bengali communities, sidelining their concerns. This resulted in social tensions and a fractured sense of national identity. By promoting a monolithic identity, the Awami League overlooked the country’s rich ethnic, cultural and linguistic diversity. Moreover, the Hasina regime made little progress in addressing the long-standing grievances of non-Bengali communities, particularly in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. The failure to fully implement the 1997 CHT Peace Accord underscores ongoing tensions in the region. Despite promises, meaningful steps towards reconciliation and development in the CHT had been lacking during Hasina’s era, leaving the indigenous populations feeling increasingly relegated. This failure to accommodate diverse identities significantly weakened the national identity, which in turn posed threats to the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
For the Awami League, Bengali nationalism was less about cultural pride and more about consolidating political dominance, both domestically and internationally. By closely linking Bangladesh’s national identity to the Bengali ethnic group, the party entrenched its own political narrative, technically positioning the country as an ally that India could count on to advance its regional interests. This approach led to a troubling reality, where Bangladesh’s foreign policy, under Hasina, heavily tilted towards India, with significant concessions made on such pressing issues as water sharing, trade imbalances and border tensions. These compromises often came at the cost of Bangladesh’s sovereignty, with the Hasina regime prioritising the preservation of political and cultural ties with India over safeguarding national interest.
As we move past the Hasina era, it is essential to dispel the myths of the Awami League’s version of Bengali nationalism that had long been used to manipulate public sentiment for political gain. Instead, we must embrace a renewed sense of Bangladeshi nationalism, one infused with patriotism. Inclusive and free from the geopolitical ambitions of others, Bangladeshi nationalism should unite the nation and prioritise our sovereignty. This forward-looking identity, rooted in the ideals of our liberation war, will enable us to navigate modern challenges while fostering progress, national unity and global respect. Furthermore, nationalism in today’s modern world must go beyond ethnocentric identities and linguistic divides, focusing instead on the collective progress of the entire nation for the betterment of humanity. Mahatma Gandhi’s insightful words resonate deeply with this idea: ‘My nationalism is as broad as my swadeshi; I want India’s rise so that the whole world may benefit.’ Gandhi’s vision of nationalism was not confined to narrow political interests but was inclusive and sought India’s prosperity while contributing to global welfare. This broader, more inclusive approach to nationalism is what the modern era demands.
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Tanbir Uddin Arman is a political analyst and researcher.