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Was the July/August monsoon movement a colour revolution, a people’s revolution, or simply a regime change? From the outset, there has been a debate among political and intellectual circles on this issue. Intellectuals associated with the fallen regime, along with supportive Indian media, have portrayed it as an American-orchestrated colour revolution or regime change. Meanwhile, many leftist theorists who participated in or supported the movement’s narrative argue that it was a mass uprising rather than a revolution. From the beginning, I have described this mass uprising as a potentially revolutionary mass movement. Although it bears some characteristics of a colour revolution, in my view, American involvement was limited to supportive measures rather than a decisive role. Instead, the active political agency of the people played the determining role here, despite the movement being driven towards a spontaneous, chaotic state under relentless gunfire and massacre by the fascist regime. The indiscriminate shooting and long-standing public resentment towards fascist rule fuelled the popular resistance, igniting a mass explosion. The organic character of this movement, its spontaneity, and the people’s long-standing political and social struggles against domestic fascist misrule suggest that it cannot be labelled solely as regime change or a colour revolution.

Supporters of the colour revolution perspective argue that the movement lacked planning or preparation for what would follow, had no single revolutionary party, and lacked a cohesive revolutionary ideology. As a result, a caretaker government similar to the ‘1/11 model’ came into power after the fall of the regime, which some see as a US-controlled government operating to implement the minus-two agenda. Although this argument may appear correct on the surface, in my opinion, people from all perspectives and ideologies united against fascism, with the public’s aspiration being to establish a democratic Bangladesh. However, it was not a democratic movement projected by foreign powers. With slogans like ‘Shoot us in the chest; we are ready,’ young students and citizens stood in the line of fire, prepared to sacrifice themselves — a phenomenon that can’t be seen in a projected movement. It was a genuinely revolutionary event, what might be called the expression of a ‘transcendental spirit’ in secular terms or, in Foucault’s words, the ‘political spirituality’ of the people. This political spirituality wasn’t directed towards any religious ideology or leftist philosophy but was rather an expression of the people’s sincere sacrifice for a democratic revolution. Considering these aspects, this movement could be viewed as a phenomenon somewhere between a colour revolution and a classical radical revolution. While it had the spirit of a mass revolution, the movement’s failure to translate the popular power into a revolutionary government with political foresight and maturity in the aftermath prevents it from being recognised as a revolution. As a result, it becomes easier to argue that this revolutionary potential was just a regime change.

It is important to note that a revolution does not always have to be a socialist or religious one; it can also be a liberal democratic revolution. In Bangladesh, most concepts of revolution have been inspired by China or Russia, and because leftists have traditionally controlled revolutionary literature, the democratic revolution in the United States in 1776 — which happened before the French Revolution in 1789 — has not been widely discussed or recognised within Bangladesh’s intellectual circles. The 2024 mass uprising in Bangladesh embodies the spirit of the French and American democratic revolutions but takes on a uniquely Bangladeshi form, with its own dynamics. This movement was against a fascist regime, which includes the colonial state structures established and practised by British and Pakistani rulers, along with the influence of the authoritarian governance model from the BAKSAL period.

While colour revolutions generally stop at regime change, the July-August mass uprising demonstrated something different: movement leaders Nahid Islam and Asif Mahmud repeatedly stated that dismantling the fascist system was their primary objective. Recently, in an interview, Nahid emphasised that while the fascist rulers were ousted, the fascist structure remains, suggesting that another mass uprising may be necessary to eradicate it completely. Another significant figure in the movement, student leader Mahfuz Alam, has been advocating in a series of interviews for social, state, and cultural reforms to create a new political framework based on a fresh consensus. Their demands to abolish the fascist state system and establish a new political settlement indicate that this movement is not simply a colour revolution. Unlike colour revolutions, which are primarily focused on regime change, this movement has focused on a vision for a new society and state. However, questions remain about whether this uprising can be considered a revolution in the classical sense, as it does not call for a new ideology-based state structure, nor has it altered the power structure within the state in terms of class or group shifts. Consequently, this mass movement does not fully fit the definitions of either a colour revolution or a revolution. Colour revolutions typically occur in countries lacking a tradition of mass uprisings and political movements, making foreign influence inevitable. However, Bangladesh has a historical tradition of political uprisings — like those of 1952, 1969, and 1990. Thus, the July-August movement aligns with the ongoing struggle of the Bangladeshi people against authoritarian rule and political oppression, which does not follow the pattern of a colour revolution.

Even many participant intellectuals and politicians see this monsoon movement as just a regime change and have therefore obstructed the formation of a revolutionary government from the start. Some thinkers aligned with left-leaning ideology repeatedly claim that this is merely a mass uprising, not a revolution. They are interpreting this 2024 uprising through a grand narrative or ideology-based definition of revolution rooted in modernist thinking. However, we are actually in a postmodern era where grand ideologies or grand narratives are no longer hegemonic in society or the world. In today’s global, media-driven AI age and in this time of technological hyper-reality, multiple narratives and ideologies coexist functionally within the same society. This makes it impossible to unify a population under a single, grand ideology from the modernist era, which is why a classic revolution is no longer possible. Instead, we will see uprisings like 2024’s, where multiple perspectives, narratives, and ideologies join forces in the struggle for a democratic framework. It doesn’t matter if you choose not to call this a revolution; in a postmodern context, this is precisely the new face of mass revolution. This may not be a revolution in the classic sense, but from a postmodern perspective, this is the face of a democratic revolution.

The concept of revolution won’t always be the same; its form will evolve. Revolutions don’t follow a single formula from books. Those who write about revolutionary ideas often say that a mass uprising becomes a true revolution only when it brings about a significant transformation in the class, social, or political structure. Now, aren’t the students demanding a transformation from the current fascist structure to a democratic one, similar to the goals of a bourgeois-democratic revolution? If an anti-fascist mass uprising here brings about a qualitative change in line with the American bourgeois-democratic revolution (1776), why wouldn’t that be considered a revolution? Our point is simple: a revolution may unfold over time, through various phases, with uncertainties and struggles. The revolutionary spirit is alive among the people and students. Why not seize that spirit and strive to lead the movement towards true revolution?’

No one here is calling for a revolution modelled after the Chinese, Russian, or Iranian revolutions; we are all talking about a democratic revolution, specifically referring to the French and American democratic revolutions. In Bangladesh, the colonial administrative structure, the Pakistani military-bureaucratic model, the BAKSAL model, and fascist frameworks are all so deeply entrenched that achieving democratic transformation here is, in itself, a revolutionary event. Many people who speak about democratic transformation through establishing people’s sovereignty are being labelled anarchists, creators of chaos, and reckless extremists. I have been saying since 2014 that even a liberal political stance in this country is seen as revolutionary work. In that sense, we support a bourgeois liberal democratic revolution, not the Chinese, Russian, or Iranian models. I have repeatedly said that the form of revolution here will not follow the old patterns. Based on the dynamics and context here, it will be something new, beyond the classical form. In a postmodern age, in an era of global expansion and continuous interaction of diverse ideas, revolution may no longer be centred around a single grand ideology as it was in the modern era. It is difficult for many here to understand that revolution can take on a different form. Grand ideological revolutions will no longer happen, nor are they needed.

The problem is that, despite the political spirituality seen among the people of Bangladesh, there was a lack of intellectual and political capacity, courage, and the mental resilience required to accept the challenge of systemic change following the mass uprising. This has led to an outcome resembling a colour revolution. The opposition to drafting a new democratic constitution and removing the fascist president, mainly to preserve the status quo by political parties, is proving to be a significant obstacle to leading this mass uprising towards victory. Although the outcome of this movement may resemble a colour revolution, it cannot be called one. The movement emerged spontaneously from the people and was driven by native factors. However, due to the serious political immaturity in terms of state and government formation and the failure of political parties to play their proper role — while trying to protect the interests of foreign agencies and the deep state — it has not yet achieved full victory. It’s worth noting that expecting results so quickly might not be realistic, though we are seeing signs of hope fading for two key reasons: A) By not suspending the current authoritarian constitution and establishing a government through a proclamation of popular uprising, the course of events has come to be represented as mob-like or deemed unconstitutional. This allows the forces of the fallen regime to spread propaganda while distracting the government from its primary goals by trapping it in conflicts and debates (from judicial appointments to all other actions, the debate around ‘constitutional versus revolutionary’ continues). The failure to remove President suggests that an understanding has formed between the BNP, the army, and foreign powers. This has clearly led to divisions on various fronts within the movement. Now, the outcome of this movement depends on how the student force and democratic elements in the country move it forward. Dismantling the existing fascist power structures and constitution will require a revolutionary process, marking a need for a new phase. Thus, student and people’s groups must declare this new phase of the movement. Proclaiming a second republic would itself be a revolutionary act, which is why some intellectuals who prefer the status quo oppose it. Unfortunately, political parties and their allied intellectuals resist this second wave as they benefit from the current constitution and power structure within it, which allow ongoing corruption and exploitation.

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Dr Zobaer Al Mahmud is a political analyst and associate professor of clinical pharmacy and pharmacology, University of Dhaka.