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THERE is little or no doubt that the recently ousted Awami League and its members established a horrific dictatorship in Bangladesh. The Awami League, as a party, and its leaders and workers, as individuals, were steeped in corruption and appeared as ruthless adversaries to their opponents. It is difficult to overlook that this party and its leaders and workers looted and smuggled billions of dollars abroad and engaged in brutal and inhumane treatment, including enforced disappearances and killings of opposition party leaders and activists. In these acts, they employed government bureaucrats and the state police force. From Begum Khaleda Zia, the most prominent opposition leader, to grassroots activists, all became victims of the atrocities and inhumanity perpetrated by this party and its members. Thus, neither the party nor its leaders and workers can evade legal punishment or moral responsibility. Ensuring legal consequences for the party and its leaders and workers, as well as moral condemnation, is among the responsibilities of a civilised society.

Yet, were there not leaders and workers in this party who refrained from direct participation in corruption or atrocities and only wished to engage in politics? Although they may be few in number, such individuals likely did and still do exist. Should we refer to them as ‘good Awami Leaguers’ in contrast to ‘bad Awami Leaguers’? Undoubtedly, these so-called ‘good Awami Leaguers’ should receive legal protection, as they committed no crimes by law. But how should we view them from a moral perspective? What should be the nature of our social relationships with them? Should they be treated similarly to other good citizens, both ethically and socially? These questions have become especially pertinent in post-August 5 Bangladesh.

In determining the nature of our moral and social relationships with these so-called ‘good Awami Leaguers’ in post-August 5 Bangladesh, the philosophical concept of ‘moral taint’ becomes highly relevant. Philosophers like Thomas Nagel, Hannah Arendt, and Karl Jaspers have introduced the notion of moral taint in philosophy. Moral taint can be defined as a condition in which an individual or a group is morally compromised due to indirect involvement with, proximity to, or association with immoral actions, systems, or individuals — even if they are not directly responsible for those wrongs. This concept suggests that one’s moral character or standing can be affected by associations that carry ethical implications. Moral taint is not about direct accountability but rather about an ethical contamination or stain that arises from being connected to wrongs in ways that implicate moral responsibility.

One’s morality can be tainted in various ways: (1) by being a member of an organisation that commits moral crimes; (2) by inheriting the moral burden of historical injustices (like slavery or colonialism); or (3) by being close to wrongdoings (proximity to wrongdoing). For example, an individual’s morality may be tainted by being part of a system, structure, organisation, or corporation that contributes to harm, even if the individual does not actively engage in harmful acts. Similarly, descendants of those who committed acts of slavery or colonialism may feel a sense of moral taint from their ancestors’ actions, despite their lack of direct participation. Additionally, simply being close to wrongdoing may invoke moral taint; for instance, witnessing harm and doing nothing, or inadvertently aiding another’s wrongdoing (such as unintentionally supplying resources that are misused), can give rise to a sense of moral taint.

From this perspective, it is clear that one’s morality may be tainted in at least three ways: (1) by being a member of an organisation that commits moral crimes, (2) by inheriting the moral burden of ancestors, and (3) by proximity to wrongdoings without resisting them. In this light, it appears that at least two of the conditions above — namely, conditions (1) and (3) — apply even to the so-called ‘good Awami Leaguers.’ Therefore, their morality too has been tainted. As such, they cannot claim to be regarded in the same way as other good citizens of Bangladesh as long as their morality remains tainted due to their affiliation with the Awami League.

Is there a way for them to be absolved of this taint? Certainly, there is. However, they must first acknowledge the crimes committed by the Awami League and its leaders and workers. They must recognise that the Awami League’s brutal and corrupt actions are punishable offences and that justice must be served for these crimes. Furthermore, they must express shame and remorse for being members of a party that committed such crimes and for being close to these wrongdoings without resisting them. They must seek forgiveness. By doing so, these so-called ‘good Awami Leaguers’ can transcend their tainted morality and elevate themselves to the status of other good citizens in the state. In short, the Awami League and the ‘bad Awami Leaguers’ must face punishment. If the so-called ‘good Awami Leaguers’ wish to be regarded as ordinary good citizens in society, they must acknowledge the crimes of their party and its leaders and workers, express shame and remorse, and seek forgiveness. In post-August 5 Bangladesh, there is no other alternative.

Finally, the concept of moral taint underscores the enduring impact of collective actions on individual morality, particularly in politically charged environments. In the case of Bangladesh’s post-August 5 reality, the onus lies not only on the perpetrators of wrongdoing but also on those who, by association, may carry a shadow of complicity. For ‘good Awami Leaguers,’ this moment calls for a deep moral reckoning, wherein they recognise the harm perpetuated by their organisation and seek genuine absolution through acknowledgement, remorse, and a commitment to ethical standards. Only by navigating this process of reflection and reform can individuals disentangle themselves from the past’s moral burdens and help foster a society grounded in justice, integrity, and unity. This journey is essential, not just for individual moral redemption but for the collective healing and progress of Bangladesh.

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Dr Mostofa Nazmul Mansur is a professor of philosophy at Jahangirnagar University.