AFTER the July-August 2024 mass uprising, the nature and framework of the interim government have sparked fresh debates in political and intellectual circles. Some argue that failing to establish a ‘revolutionary government’ following such a massive uprising was a mistake. This has led to disagreements on how best to address the ongoing crisis in the country. While some, including the BNP and many political analysts, advocate for resolving the crisis through parliamentary elections to maintain constitutional continuity, others argue for drafting a new democratic constitution through a Constituent Assembly election and holding subsequent elections based on that new framework. In a recent seminar, legal adviser Asif Nazrul stated, ‘On the 5th, when the Army Chief called, the BNP went, Jamaat went, Gono Odhikar Moncho went. I sat in a corner. At that time, no party proposed forming a revolutionary government instead of a constitutional one. If that was a mistake, then we all made that mistake in that situation.’
However, it must be understood that Bangladesh’s political crisis cannot be resolved within the framework of the existing constitution. Absorbing the mass uprising into the current constitutional framework was a mistake. This uprising had revolutionary potential, but attempts were made to dilute it by seeking solutions solely within the confines of the existing constitution, which has functioned as a tool of ‘constitutional fascism.’ What was needed was to suspend the constitution and establish a ‘national revolutionary government.’ Instead, bypassing political parties, everything was placed under the control of bureaucrats, civil society, and NGOs, forming a government resembling the 1/11 caretaker model of 2007. With the active involvement of regional and global agencies, the situation has regressed to 2007–2009. Despite a mass uprising, a regime change occurred, but there was no subsequent plan for what to do next. Leaving everything in the hands of politically inexperienced individuals has led to constitutional complications, from appointing justices to removing the president.
This points to similarities between the character of this movement and a ‘colour revolution,’ where regime change occurs due to democratic aspirations, but the lack of ideological goals creates a vacuum later filled by foreign agencies. However, the movement is also distinct from a ‘colour revolution.’ The uprising was against prolonged fascist rule, whereas in countries like Georgia, Ukraine, Yugoslavia, or Serbia, colour revolutions were mainly against authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes. Moreover, in colour revolutions, the media often overwhelmingly supports the movement. In contrast, the majority of media and intellectuals in Bangladesh opposed the 2024 mass uprising. For this reason, I have opposed labelling this movement as a ‘colour revolution’ from the outset, as it undermines the active political agency of the Bangladeshi people. Instead, this movement can be seen as something between a colour revolution and a classical radical revolution. However, it appears we are heading towards the outcome of a colour revolution, with agencies and the deep state prevailing.
To make the uprising truly victorious, we must focus on its political outcome. This means dismantling the mechanisms and tools of fascist rule, drafting a new democratic constitution, and using it as the foundation to strengthen state and constitutional institutions while reorganising the administration to establish individual sovereignty and rights. However, hastily organising elections based on the old constitution and forming a parliament will not resolve the political crisis. Although the existing constitution has some positive aspects, it lacks a framework for establishing people’s sovereignty to protect the core principle of democracy — the sovereignty of the individual. Instead, sovereignty has been vested in the parliament or the government, allowing those in power — whether through a two-thirds majority in parliament, illegitimate elections, or military takeovers — to amend the constitution at will. As a result, the constitution has become a tool for establishing ‘constitutional authoritarianism. The abolition of the caretaker government system through the 15th Amendment, for instance, paved the way for three consecutive fraudulent elections. Doesn’t this make the constitution a shield for undemocratic governance? Repeated amendments have left it far removed from its original form.
Provisions concentrating power in the hands of the Prime Minister, granting sole control over the three branches of government, restricting MPs’ independent opinions through Article 70, and many others inherently enable authoritarian governance. While the constitution includes some provisions for political and fundamental human rights — such as freedom of expression and the right to protest — there is no effective protection to ensure these rights. The power structures outlined in the constitution prioritise governmental stability over individual rights, severely restricting freedom of speech and personal liberties. This structure has permitted the enactment and enforcement of draconian laws, such as the Digital Security Act, which have significantly curtailed freedom of expression and personal freedoms. Moreover, the constitution was drafted without considering public opinion, relying solely on lawyers to frame it as a legal document rather than a national charter. There is also no provision for public participation through referendums to amend or revise the constitution, imposing a ‘parliamentary authoritarianism’ on the people. Consequently, any parliament formed under the existing constitution and state structure is unlikely to enact democratic reforms of the constitution.
The problem now is that political parties are primarily using the rhetoric of ‘constitutional continuity’ to dismiss the spirit of the mass uprising. Leaders of political parties surely know that it was under the pretext of preserving constitutional continuity that the fraudulent elections of 2014, 2018, and 2024 took place. It was also under the guise of constitutional continuity that repression and persecution were inflicted on all opposition parties, including the BNP. The so-called effort to resolve constitutional crises was used to impose a coercive totalitarian regime, effectively depriving the people of their democratic rights and deepening the political crisis over the past decade. Yet, some BNP leaders now speak of preserving ‘constitutional continuity,’ claiming it is necessary to avoid further political crises! Some are even accusing the BNP of obstructing reformative measures by advocating constitutional continuity, thereby exacerbating the political crisis.
Questions are being raised about whether these BNP leaders truly understand people-centric politics or whether they are engaging in agency-driven politics to keep the country mired in crisis. The mass uprising of 2024 took place by disregarding the constitution. An uprising does not happen while adhering to a constitution that itself serves as a tool for undemocratic governance. It is incomprehensible how they can seek to uphold the current constitution, which for the past 15 years has ignored the sovereignty of the people and imposed an authoritarian, one-party, fascist structure upon them. If we repeat the same mistake as in 1990, the effort to establish a democratic state will once again be derailed.
It seems that the BNP is opposing the revolutionary transformation of the state structure because it seeks to come to power through superficial, sugar-coated reforms. As a result, the BNP shows little interest in drafting a new constitution — one that would suspend the current ‘authoritarian’ constitution and replace it with a democratic framework. This reluctance stems either from its compromises with regional and global powers or from its fear that a revolutionary restructuring of the power framework would make governing and politics more challenging for itself. However, the July-August mass uprising was not a singular movement led by the BNP. Therefore, the BNP’s demands cannot be equated with the demands of the protesters. The BNP needs to reform its own politics. After such a massive public revolution, the BNP should focus on building a strong and independent Bangladesh by relying on the power of its people.
Bangladesh’s recent mass uprising is the most powerful in the country’s history. Yet, despite such an opportunity, those who focus solely on a transfer of power rather than working for the revolutionary transformation of the country seem disconnected from the aspirations and desires of the people. By emphasising so-called ‘constitutional continuity,’ they are obstructing the mass uprising from evolving into the establishment of true ‘popular sovereignty.’ Framing a political crisis as a constitutional crisis is essentially part of a political project rooted in agency-driven politics — something they may fail to understand. The constitutional crisis was relevant from 2013 to 2014, but after the establishment of ‘constitutional fascism,’ such discussions are meaningless. Those who speak of constitutional continuity to oppose the genuine democratic transformation of the 2024 mass uprising will, in effect, ensure its failure by advocating for political stability over revolutionary change. Without drafting a new constitution and merely maintaining a superficial system of governance, the country will continue to operate under its outdated and fragile framework. The 2024 mass uprising was a public verdict against constitutional authoritarianism — or ‘constitutional fascism.’ Therefore, the narrative of constitutional continuity is, in fact, the greatest obstacle to creating a new political settlement.
However, unlike in 1990, we cannot afford to repeat the same mistakes this time. Following the mass uprising, we need to prioritise a revolutionary transformation of the undemocratic state structure, inherited from the British and Pakistani military-bureaucratic systems and reinforced by fascist frameworks. This requires first holding elections for a Constituent Assembly to draft a new democratic constitution, which would outline the reorganisation of constitutional and other state institutions. Only then can elections be conducted based on this new constitution. The BNP, however, seems to be trying to preserve the existing fascist state structure and its mechanisms under the guise of preventing a constitutional crisis. Even three and a half months after the mass uprising, they are merely demanding reforms in the electoral system without seeking a complete reorganisation of the state’s structure and institutions. The BNP needs to change its current stance and support the dismantling of the fascist state framework, along with comprehensive reforms and the reconstruction of all institutions. Political leaders in the country should view this mass uprising not as a mere ladder to power but as an opportunity to reform the state. Elections should only take place after the state’s reorganisation. Without restructuring the state, a mere general election will not resolve our political crisis.
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Dr Zobaer Al Mahmud is a political analyst and associate professor of clinical pharmacy and pharmacology, University of Dhaka.