IN AN era of political fragmentation, the concepts of divisive politics and political spirituality provide critical lenses for understanding emerging political realities and perhaps possibilities. Nationalism, initially a unifying force against colonial oppression, has often devolved into exclusionary ideologies, resulting in divisions within the populace of modern states, contrary to its original purpose. In post-independence Bangladesh, this transformation is evident in the state-sponsored narrative and the 1972 constitution, where Bengali identity and secularism became the sole national markers, disregarding their broader relevance and implications. This arbitrariness and constitutional homogenisation of diverse ethnic and religious communities fuelled communalism as identities, subconscious politico-cultural practices, and persuasions became more pronounced in collective consciousness in response. Such impositions alienated many and deepened societal divisions, a trend further exacerbated by subsequent political regimes, particularly the Awami regime (2009鈥�2024), which prioritised fighting communalism by constructing an opposing narrative typical of nationalism in the name of nation-building while ignoring the liberation ideals of equality, human dignity and social justice.
In 1977, secularism was removed from the constitution and replaced by 鈥楤ismillah; absolute trust and faith in Almighty Allah鈥� through a directive of martial law during the rule of Ziaur Rahman. In 1988, the parliament of Bangladesh declared Islam the state religion during the presidency of Hussain Muhammad Ershad. This marked another significant misstep in the political history of Bangladesh, focusing on national identity-building rather than the core commitments of the liberation war and its historical context, which is intertwined with economic class and cultural politics.
Reflecting on these historical failures, we must look beyond rigid nationalistic boundaries to redefine the collective expressions of politics. The inadequacies of the Pakistani state, post-1971 governance, Bengali nationalism, and the perplexities surrounding secularism up to 2024 offer valuable insights for understanding the renewed political agency in the context of the July uprising. Considering the nature and political expressions of the July uprising, the people of Bangladesh now have a historic opportunity to form a political community that prioritises collective aspirations over identity markers while embracing diversity. The uprising itself represents a transformative moment in the political history of Bangladesh, marking a shift away from traditional ideological frameworks and ushering in a new era of political consciousness. This consciousness evolved over time, blending intellectual preparation with the existential political realities.
Due to the political history of Bengal 鈥� for example, rulers from various religious traditions such as Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam and Christianity 鈥� its populace has been introduced to diverse forms of epistemology that have shaped their identity, cultural practices and political agency, offering greater possibilities for the people of this land. However, historically, these possibilities have never been fully realised or exercised. It is important to note that Muslim rulers are primarily identified by their religion in historical narratives. In contrast, rulers from other traditions are often identified through alternative markers, such as their dynasty, type of governance, centrality of rule, or nationality. This reflects epistemic violence in the process of historicising, where specific traditions have been treated in a particular manner, sidelining their epistemic propositions and contributions. This process has persisted from the colonial era to the birth of Bangladesh, which was once East Bengal and later East Pakistan. This has also hindered the realisation and exercise of greater political possibilities.
In this context, the July uprising is an organic response from the masses, driven by lived experiences, practical demands and a political-spiritual awakening, signalling a realisation of greater political possibilities that have yet to be fully exercised. The uprising challenges entrenched systems of governance and envisions a more inclusive and participatory political future, leaving footprints of a political community striving to overcome divisive politics and explore possibilities for the greater well-being of its members. Given its diverse spectrum, the July uprising stands as the highest collective expression of these shared aspirations. At the core of this transformation lies the politics of political spirituality. This concept transcends religious boundaries, redefining moral, intellectual and existential dimensions. Here, collective resistance against oppression reflects a deeper realisation of political potential and purpose. Drawing parallels with Michel Foucault鈥檚 analysis of Iran鈥檚 Revolution of 1979, political spirituality embodies the political expression of the will for alterity, bringing forth a new form of subjectivity and proposing new orders rooted in shared aspirations that resist the existing political order.
The 5th of August 2024 stands as a decisive moment in Bangladesh鈥檚 history, marking the fall of a fascist government as a monumental shift that has the highest potential to transcend the mere removal of a government and begin a transformative movement towards a new political order, which might end up as a complete revolution. While looking for the symptoms of such a revolution, this movement underscores the diminishing relevance of existing ideological politics (leftist, nationalist, Islamist, etc) in terms of their approach and nature. These political practices are no longer as relevant as they once were in various political and historical contexts, requiring new political commitment and adjustment to accommodate the newly awakened consciousness. The July uprising, in contrast, emphasises a politics of lived reality, where truths are discovered through collective experiences, reflecting the people鈥檚 understanding of their political and civil rights gained through daily struggles. This shift renders earlier political and ideological rhetoric obsolete, replacing it with authentic expressions of collective demands grounded in language, culture and shared values.
As the newly formed interim movement gains momentum, if we read this as a continuous process, the question of what comes next remains critical. History shows that governance systems often evolve over time. While the government has fallen, the deeply entrenched fascist structures as a tendency 鈥� intellectual, cultural and political 鈥� remain largely intact. These systems of control have permeated both governance and the everyday lives of Bangladesh鈥檚 citizens. One of the greatest challenges in overcoming fascism is understanding how political parties can transform into fascist regimes.
In Bangladesh, the fallen Sheikh Hasina regime blurred the lines between state power and party ideology, employing state violence and repressive laws to maintain control. These methods were not random acts of aggression but deeply ingrained strategies to suppress dissent. However, the struggle for the people of Bangladesh is far from over. In this case, it will depend on the level of political consciousness rooted among the people and how intense and organised they are in dismantling fascist structures embedded in state institutions. By doing so, a political community can emerge to uphold the organic expressions of the July uprising, fostering greater possibilities. At this stage, the primary concern should be the nature of the political atmosphere that will facilitate the interim government and the extent to which this government is capable of or committed to accommodating all the aspirations and possibilities realised through the July uprising.
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Md Abu Salek Khan is a writer and researcher.