¶¶Òõ¾«Æ·

THE Arakan Army on December 20, 2024 captured the headquarters of the Myanmar military’s western command in Ann town, marking a historic occasion for the organisation’s meteoric rise to power in Rakhine State controlling majority of the parts. The Arakan Army now controls 14 of 17 townships of Rakhine State, including Paletwa township in neighbouring Chin State.

The Arakan Army’s sweeping victory in Rakhine State since November 2023 has shifted the balance of power over a wide area in western Myanmar. The Arakan Army has systematically dismantled junta control by starting with coordinated attacks as part of Operation 1027 with its Brotherhood Alliance partners. They controlled all of Myanmar’s 168-mile border with Bangladesh after the liberation of Maungdaw in December 2024. The subsequent fall of Ann township and the western command headquarters has left the military junta clinging to three coastal townships — Sittwe, Kyaukphyu, and Munaung.

Behind the success of the Arakan Army comes the methodical way of building power under the visionary leadership of commander-in-chief Twan Mrat Naing. The organisation was founded in 2009 with 26 members and has produced a comprehensive road map for liberating Rakhine State that it has implemented systematically over 15 years. The Arakan Army made its stand on being very different from other armed movements in Arakan as Oo Hla Saw, Mrauk U’s political commissar, is reported to have said.

For 2009–2011, the first four batches of fighters trained there in Kachin State had about 400 members. The trained cadres were stationed with the Kachin Independence Army to gain on-the-ground combat experience while others were assigned to work in major cities such as Sittwe, Mandalay and Yangon to build networks and recruitment channels.

In 2014, the Arakan Army began infiltrating and sowing functionaries on various locations and identifying and recruiting student leaders and monks for local support there. The organisation is at its organised spread into Rakhine State proper. It came as the Arakan Army leadership’s first public appearance in uniforms at an Arakanese conference in Kyaukphyu, signalling the start of its more visible presence in the region.

The Arakan Army leadership knew precisely what to do in controlling key strategic areas and trade routes. The initial choice of focus on northern Rakhine and the region around the Myanmar-India-Bangladesh tri-junction was specifically made, an Arakan Army colonel heading a regional command explained, because ‘it was necessary to control the trade routes and into and out of India and Bangladesh.’

The foresight to put administrative capacity as well as military capabilities into place was demonstrated by forming the United League of Arakan in 2015 with the Arakan Army as its political wing. It mattered for governance in liberated areas and the establishment of international legitimacy. The Arakan Army leadership also showed advanced organisational ability setting up nine military regional commands, which are directed in a war office on a secret location where Twan Mrat Naing and his deputy Brigadier Venereal Dr Nyo Twan Aung coordinates operations with senior officers.

The other side of the leadership’s careful cultivation of public support, however, has been equally important: inclusive messaging and nation-building rhetoric. Whereas previous armed groups in Arakan favoured discrimination along racial or religious lines, the Arakan Army was the first to openly espouse an inclusive vision. The Arakan Army entered an informal ceasefire with the military in November 2020 which it had used to empower its positions and get ready for further operation. Following another ceasefire, hostility resumed early in 2022, but the Arakan Army continued to promote strategic flexibility as it built to the decisive November 2023 offensive that has made the Arakan Army dominant in Rakhine State.

Significant demographic and recruitment advantages have enabled the Arakan Army to expand from 26 initial members to a force able to defeat Myanmar’s military across Rakhine State. The large pool of potential recruits for the Arakan Army is the result of the socioeconomic conditions in Rakhine State. World Bank data say that 78 per cent of Rakhine people live below the poverty line and the young Rakhine people have limited economic opportunities. The combination of a demographic youth bulge within the Arakan Army and economic marginalisation has acted as a reservoir of potential fighters who perceive joining the organisation as a chance to wage a fight for the community’s dreams.

In addition, the Arakan Army has also showed flexibility in its recruitment approach directing older recruits, above 35 years, into the United League of Arakan’s administrative apparatus as opposed to combat roles. The assigning of roles in this age-appropriate manner has contributed to combat effectiveness while it gas also contributed to developing capacity in civilian governance. In addition, the organisation has integrated former senior political activists from other parties into the United League of Arakan without compromising its military efficiency while achieving political expansion.

In recent battles, the contrast between the Arakan Army’s motivated young fighters and the increasingly demoralised junta forces has become a crucial factor. It has also been observed that the Myanmar military is lacking in morale and demotivation, especially since confronting the Arakan Army’s cadres. In particular, this has been especially evident in recent operations — the capture of the BGP5 base when hundreds of demoralised junta soldiers finally capitulated to the Arakan Army forces. In addition, the organisation also made declarations of the ‘Way of Rakhita’ and ‘Arakan Dream’ in 2019 which struck a chord with the Rakhine people’s desire for autonomy and growth.

The Arakan Army’s military success has greatly been a result of its comprehensive understanding and exploitation of Rakhine State’s geography. However, the geography of Rakhine State — a long, thin place, mostly flat with rivers and streams cut through it — has been to the Arakan Army’s advantage, the military to its disadvantage. Because o f the poor condition of highways, the river became the main transport arteries in the region and the Arakan Army took the full advantage of its superior riverine capabilities.

This flexible approach to river transport has conferred an important mobility advantage, enabling the Arakan Army forces to concentrate rapidly on operation and maintain supply lines to frontline units. In contrast, the military relies on poor road networks that have left their forces at risks of ambush while it has become more and more difficult to resupply.

Arakan Army and United League of Arakan offices still have access to satellite internet, satellite phones and tactical radio networks. However, the Arakan Army intimately knows its local geography and it has been able to isolate and reduce military strong points. This was most obvious when it came to the siege of BGP5, the last big junta position in northern Rakhine. Because it understood the terrain, the Arakan Army could cut off the military supply routes while keeping its logistics up and running, forcing hundreds of junta troops to surrender. A similar exploitation of geographic advantages was showed in the capture of Ann township and the western command headquarters.

Since 2015, the Arakan Army joined the Northern Alliance along with the Tang National Liberation Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and what was then known as the Kachin Independence Army, the Arakan Army has cultivated solution-oriented partnership in advancing its objectives while still staying operationally independent.

Organisational participation in the United Wa State Army-led Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee since 2017 and involvement in the Three Brotherhood Alliance in 2019 show its capacity to be in several, supplementary alliance networks. Operation 1027, launched in October 2023 by the Three Brotherhood Alliance, proved to be valuable to the military of these alliances. The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance and the National Liberation Army fought junta forces north of Shan State, seizing the strategic city of Lashio and the northeast regional command while the Arakan Army initiated its offensive in Rakhine State against a military already spread thin.

Formally declining association with the National Unity Government, the Arakan Army has, nevertheless, trained and supplied weapons to various PDF units around the country, creating useful relationships without severing the association. The Arakan Army has particularly grown to be significant with its alliance with the Chin Brotherhood Alliance in the neighbouring Chin State. This partnership also gave a demonstration of the military value of joint operation to Matupi in June 2024, capturing vital supply lines from India’s Mizoram state. This relationship has renewed the Arakan Army with strategic depth and has protected the Arakan Army’s northern flank whilst concentrating on operations in Rakhine State.

While in other regions of Myanmar, multiple armed groups are vying for legitimacy and resources, the Arakan Army does not face a serious rival in the ranks of the Rakhine Buddhist community. At the same time, the previous Rakhine armed groups have seen their rise in the Arakan Army coincide with their decline or marginalisation. The Arakan National Council, which once had enough clout to join the United Nationalities Federal Council in 2011, has fallen off the map. The Arakan Liberation Party and its armed wing, the Arakan Liberation Army, have broken into combatant groups that have not yet been able to marshal a fighting force and no more than 100 ALP members are fighting, with the bulk of them still based in Sittwe.

Both military success and political acumen have led to the consolidation of representation. In 2019, the Arakan Army’s declarations of the Way of Rakhita and Arakan Dream acted as a highly effective expression of the popular desire for self-determination and a more sophisticated and inclusive vision than previous movements.

The major areas of potential challenge to the Arakan Army authority are some of the Rohingya militant organisations such as Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army based in the northern part of Rakhine State. However, these groups have largely fled to Bangladesh following Arakan Army advances. This now reveals the challenges that the Arakan Army will face in governing an ethnically diverse region due to its complex relationship with the Rohingya community — promising such integration while simultaneously conducting military operations against Rohingya militants. Yet the Arakan Army is unchallenged within the core of resistance to a central authority, the Buddhist Rakhine, which forms the backbone of the organisation. By providing the Arakan Army and its political wing, the United League of Arakan, with a unified military and political leadership, has been able to devise and communicate a coherent strategy.

In summary, the transformation of the Arakan Army from a 26-member organisation in 2009 to a dominant force in Rakhine state is the largest success the ethnic armed organisations have seen in the history of armies in Myanmar. Its grip on 14 out of 17 Rakhine townships, along with the capture of the western command headquarters, hints at the possibility of a de facto autonomous region beaming out from across Myanmar’s western frontier. Such a development has big implications for Myanmar’s political future and regional stability. There are still significant challenges to be accomplished, especially in leading a populace that is diverse and managing relationships with else in the world including China and Bangladesh.

Ìý

Kawser Uddin Mahmud, a researcher at the KRF Centre for Bangladesh and global affairs, is a geopolitical analyst and international relations author based in Dhaka.