SOUTH Asia’s rivers are its lifeblood, weaving through nations, nourishing cultures, and sustaining economies for centuries. In Bangladesh, these once-majestic waterways — symbols of abundance and vitality — are now embattled arenas where survival and sovereignty collide. Villages once thriving on the banks of rivers like the Teesta now grapple with parched fields, empty fishing nets, and a creeping sense of despair.
The water-sharing disputes with India go far beyond environmental challenges; they are entrenched in deep-seated political asymmetries, historical grievances, and the volatile geopolitics of a region fraught with competing ambitions. This is no mere bilateral disagreement — it is a microcosm of how climate uncertainty and the relentless demands of growing populations are turning shared natural resources into flashpoints of contention.
For Bangladesh, the stakes are existential. For India, they hinge on balancing domestic politics with its aspirations for regional leadership. Together, these dynamics make the rivers of South Asia not just physical arteries of life but also powerful symbols of the tensions shaping the region’s future.
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Lifeblood
BANGLADESH’S geography is shaped by water, with 54 of its 57 transboundary rivers originating in India. Chief among them is the River Teesta, a crucial lifeline for the northern regions. Flowing through the districts of Rangpur, Kurigram, and Lalmonirhat, the river irrigates approximately 14 per cent of Bangladesh’s arable land and sustains 7.3 per cent of the population.
Yet, during the dry season, the Teesta dwindles to a trickle. Water levels that once reached 6,500 cubic feet per second in the 1990s now plummet to as low as 700. For smallholder farmers, this is devastating. Crops fail, livelihoods are lost, and migration to overcrowded urban centres becomes the only recourse.
The root cause of this crisis lies upstream, where India has built dams and barrages to control the Teesta’s flow. While these projects support India’s agricultural and hydropower needs, they come at a significant cost to downstream Bangladesh.
This pattern, seen across South Asia, where upstream nations often prioritise national development over regional cooperation, leaving downstream nations like Bangladesh to bear the brunt.
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Politics of Teesta agreement
THE Teesta water sharing agreement was meant to address this imbalance. Under the terms, India would allocate 37.5 per cent of the Teesta’s water to Bangladesh, keeping 42.5 per cent for itself. Yet, more than a decade later, the agreement remains unsigned, mired in political deadlock.
The crux of the problem lies within India’s federal system. West Bengal, the Indian state through which the Teesta flows before entering Bangladesh, wields significant influence over water management decisions. The state’s chief minister Mamata Banerjee has consistently opposed the agreement, arguing that West Bengal’s farmers depend on the Teesta for their own irrigation needs.
This opposition reflects a broader dynamic in Indian politics, where state governments often clash with the central government on resource allocation. For New Delhi, resolving the Teesta dispute is a matter of foreign policy and regional stability. For Kolkata, it is a matter of domestic priorities and electoral politics. These competing interests have left Bangladesh caught in a web of bureaucratic inertia and political brinkmanship.
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Water as tool of hegemony
FOR Bangladesh, the Teesta dispute is emblematic of a larger struggle with India’s hydro-political dominance. As the upstream nation, India controls the flow of rivers that are vital to Bangladesh’s economy and ecology. This asymmetry has allowed India to unilaterally implement projects like the Farakka Barrage on the Ganges River, which diverts water to Kolkata but reduces its flow into Bangladesh.
The Farakka Barrage, constructed in 1972, has had devastating consequences downstream. Reduced water flow has led to increased salinity in the Sundarbans, the world’s largest mangrove forest, threatening its biodiversity and the livelihoods of local fishing communities. Meanwhile, during monsoon months, sudden releases of water from the barrage cause flooding in low-lying areas of Bangladesh, displacing thousands.
Bangladesh has sought redress through diplomacy, raising the issue in international forums and advocating for adherence to global water-sharing norms. However, India’s position as a regional hegemon has often led to unilateral decision-making, sidelining Bangladesh’s concerns. This dynamic reflects broader patterns in South Asia, where smaller nations struggle to assert their rights in the face of larger, more powerful neighbours.
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Role of climate change
CLIMATE change adds another layer of complexity to the water-sharing crisis. Erratic rainfall patterns, melting Himalayan glaciers, and rising temperatures are altering the flow of South Asia’s rivers. In the Brahmaputra basin, for example, monsoon flows have intensified, increasing flood risks in northern Bangladesh. Meanwhile, dry-season flows in the Ganges and Teesta rivers have declined, exacerbating water scarcity.
These changes are not just environmental — they are deeply political. As rivers become less predictable, disputes over water allocation are likely to intensify. For Bangladesh, which contributes minimally to global emissions but suffers disproportionately from climate impacts, the stakes are particularly high. Addressing this crisis requires not just technical solutions but also a commitment to climate justice and regional cooperation.
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Geopolitical dimensions
THE India-Bangladesh water dispute is not happening in a vacuum. It is part of a broader geopolitical landscape where India’s role as a regional leader is being tested. China, for instance, has been making inroads in South Asia through its Belt and Road Initiative, funding infrastructure projects in countries like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal. For Bangladesh, Chinese investments offer an alternative to India’s perceived dominance.
This dynamic complicates India’s position. On the one hand, it must address Bangladesh’s grievances to maintain its influence in the region. On the other hand, it must balance these diplomatic concerns with domestic political realities, particularly in states like West Bengal. This balancing act is becoming increasingly difficult as water scarcity and climate change heighten tensions.
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Path Forward
RESOLVING the India-Bangladesh water dispute is undoubtedly complex, but far from insurmountable.Ìý
New Delhi must prioritise finalising the long-delayed Teesta treaty by addressing West Bengal’s concerns. Investments in water-efficient technologies and alternative irrigation systems could ease the region’s dependence on Teesta waters and create a pathway for agreement.Ìý
Established in 1972, the Joint Rivers Commission has largely failed to resolve disputes effectively. Empowering it with greater authority, resources, and a clear mandate could foster better coordination and facilitate conflict resolution.Ìý
A basin-wide approach involving upstream nations like Nepal and Bhutan in water management discussions could help formulate integrated solutions that benefit all riparian states.
Both nations must also invest in climate-resilient infrastructure to counter the growing challenges of water scarcity and unpredictability. This includes flood control systems, drought-resistant crops, and improved irrigation networks.Ìý
While India has historically resisted third-party involvement, neutral mediators such as the United Nations or the World Bank could serve as trustworthy facilitators to build confidence and ensure adherence to agreements.Ìý
Finally, the voices of those most affected — farmers, fishers, and urban communities — must be included in decision-making processes. Establishing cross-border community forums can foster trust, ground policies in local realities, and bridge divides between nations.Ìý
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Why it matters
THE India-Bangladesh water dispute is not just about rivers — it is about power, survival, and the future of South Asia. For Bangladesh, equitable water sharing is essential to its agricultural stability, economic resilience, and ecological health. For India, resolving this crisis is critical to maintaining its regional leadership and countering narratives of hegemony.
As climate change accelerates and water becomes an increasingly scarce resource, the stakes will only grow higher. The world is watching. Will India and Bangladesh rise to the challenge, or will their shared rivers continue to divide them?
The answer will shape the future of South Asia — and offer lessons for a world grappling with the politics of water in an era of scarcity.
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Md Obaidullah is a visiting scholar at development studies department in Daffodil International University.