WHEN the chief advisor professor Muhammad Yunus extended an official invitation to the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to conduct an independent fact-finding into human rights violations committed during the July mass uprising, it was highly commended by rights organisations and civil society alike, except for those sections of the population and state agencies that had feared that exposing facts in their entirety would harm their interests. His undeterred stand in finding facts finally made a way for the first-ever UN fact-finding mission to Bangladesh since its independence. The premise that the Human Rights Council-mandated investigation would have greater independence and credibility than that led by domestic institutions could not be refuted even by the harshest critics of the interim government.
During the initial post-mass uprising period, it became apparent that the interim government would face an upheaval battle to bring the perpetrators of mass atrocity to justice since, along with several objectionable actions taken by security agencies in apprehending top leaders of the fallen regime, the elements of the Awami regime, including the ousted prime minister herself, blatantly denied any mass killings and have continued to use their networks of allies to propagate a narrative that squarely puts blame on outside powers. Had the interim government launched its own investigation, it would have handed an opportunity to Hasina regime supporters to dub the investigation as a politically motivated 鈥榬evenge action鈥� against the regime. Given that such revenge tactics to disempower or criminalise opponent political forces have always topped the 鈥榤ust-do list鈥� for every incoming government in the past, an investigation led by domestic institutions would certainly have invited much scepticism about the impartiality of the investigation from both citizens and the watchful international community. Undoubtedly, the interim government has made the best strategic choice it had at its disposal.
The only catch with engaging impartial independent bodies like the UN is that the end report either be rejected by the host or be endorsed in its entirety. Cherry-picking to accept the bits that suit the host鈥檚 agenda and rejecting the rest is not an option. Questioning the reliability of certain facts by the host will inevitably invalidate the credibility of all other facts, which is by all means undesirable. This is the very juncture where we can find the interim government standing. The UN fact-finding report, published on 12 February 2025, exposes the ousted prime minister鈥檚 commanding role in possible crimes against humanity during the July-August mass uprising and details rights violations, including against religious minorities and indigenous peoples, that had occurred in a short window of time from August 5 to 15, 2024. While the government was quick to pick up the facts on Hasina鈥檚 role on the very day the report was published, it is yet to see how the interim government will address the facts presented on human rights violations against religious minorities and indigenous peoples under its watch, especially when it has repeatedly denied allegations of targeted attacks and persecution of religious and ethnic minorities since August 5. Will it challenge those facts at the expense of invalidating others, or will it accept those as facts?
We observed that the interim government unwittingly or purposely has chosen to pick up the extreme opposite narrative in an effort to dismantle India鈥檚 exaggerated and often outlandish claims of minority persecution in Bangladesh through its disinformation campaign over the past several months. The interim government could have explored ways to tackle the campaign in ways other than resorting to upright denial of communally motivated attacks on minorities and indigenous peoples. When it was absolutely impossible to categorise such incidents as otherwise, it resorted to identifying them as isolated incidents. In the midst of heightening anti-India sentiment among the general public, an advisor鈥檚 public assertion, which attributed one communal violence incident against indigenous peoples to conspiracy by external forces, fed straight into the populist narrative that the government was eager to establish. The fact that such a remark was made prior to any investigation being launched sent a clear message: the course of justice would not be without political interference from the government. The government鈥檚 failure to take a stern stand against minority persecution in the post-mass uprising period has essentially led to the normalisation of violence against minority groups.
We have alarmingly seen how statements such as 鈥榯here are no minorities in Bangladesh; everyone is a citizen with equal rights鈥� have been popularised by both the premier and protagonists of the July mass uprising, completely disregarding the inherent vulnerability that comes with minority identity in Bangladesh and elsewhere. One need not have knowledge of social theories on correlations of intersectionality of identities and social vulnerabilities to understand this. If we take a quick glance into the past, from the Hasina regime and backwards, the pattern is telling. Whenever there was an unrest or political instability, temples and churches were vandalised or torched, not mosques; homes and business establishments of indigenous persons were vandalised or torched, not those of Bengali inhabitants in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. And the interim government has so far failed to disband this pattern and will likely sustain it instead, as it continues to follow past regimes鈥� modus operandi in addressing rights violations against minority and indigenous communities.
For instance, in the September 2024 incidents of communal attack in CHT, two Indigenous youth and two others were allegedly killed by the military and Bengali inhabitants, respectively; hundreds were injured, and properties were vandalised and torched. Given the very sensitive nature of the allegation made against the military and the complex political context of CHT riddled with regional party conflict and military rule, seasoned rights defenders and international rights organisations repeatedly urged the government to invite the UN to investigate. Instead, like every past incident of communal violence against indigenous peoples, an inquiry committee headed by a bureaucrat was vested with the responsibility. As rightly anticipated, like every past incident, no one knows what that report contains or whether a report was even produced, since it has not been made public to date. The following series of incidents, communal violence in the CHT on October 1, 2024, and the most recent January 15 attack on indigenous youths and students in Dhaka, is the crude manifestation of how impunity increasingly emboldens perpetrators. One should expect repeated violence against indigenous peoples during the remainder of the interim government鈥檚 tenure unless it steps up to take appropriate measures.
To ensure justice, apprehending perpetrators is a must. As of February 22, law enforcement agencies have captured five perpetrators involved in the January 15 attack, despite facing significant pushback and resistance from vested interest groups that carried out that attack and played key roles in previous incidents. A commendable, much-needed move by the authorities. This momentum needs to be kept up until justice is served for all past cases of violence against these groups. However, our past experiences suggest that without an independent body engaging in investigating and monitoring the process, justice is likely to be evaded by perpetrators.听
It is noteworthy that similar calls for UN engagement in investigating rights violations against minority and indigenous communities were made on multiple occasions during the Hasina regime, though without any avail. Unlike the Hasina government, there should be no reason for the interim government not to extend an invitation to the UN to investigate such incidents unless it is committed to protecting groups and agencies whose interests will be harmed if exposed. Besides, it has become apparent that the interim government will not be able to ensure justice and guarantees of non-occurrence of rights violations through the judiciary, law enforcement, security and intelligence agencies that it has inherited in an abysmal state from the Hasina regime.
In this critical transition period, continuation of engagement with UN bodies and mechanisms can provide much needed-assistance to the interim government in its efforts to advance justice and accountability and its long-term reform efforts. Extending standing invitations to UN Human Rights Council special procedures, a recommendation made by the UN fact-finding mission, can be a start. The interim government should also seriously consider the proposal from the OHCHR to open a country office in Bangladesh, a proposal that was discussed with the interim government during UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Mr Volker T眉rks visit to Bangladesh in October 2024.
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Rani Yan Yan is the advisor of Chakma Circle and an indigenous people鈥檚 human rights defender.