JOHN Fitzgerald Kennedy, the 35th President of the United States, used to say, 鈥�domestic policy can only defeat us; foreign policy can kill us.鈥� This statement signifies the importance of foreign policy of a nation. Indeed, the possession of foreign policy autonomy is a cardinal attribute of sovereignty 鈥� the most important element of a state. However, while every state strives to attain its national interests through its foreign policy, a number of factors, including miscalculations, inefficiency, lack of clear objectives and passivity, can lead states into making mistakes in foreign policy.
Mistakes in foreign policy often harm the national interests of states, resulting in political-diplomatic crises, economic-financial losses, or military-strategic reversals. In some cases, foreign policy mistakes can prove deadly for states. For instance, the decision of Napoleon to invade Spain and Russia ruined the French empire; the decision of Kaiser Wilhelm II to concurrently wage wars on Russia and France ultimately destroyed the Second Reich; the decision of the National Socialists to invade the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics wrecked the Third Reich; and the decision of the Soviet Politburo to engage in a Cold War against both the Western World and China ultimately shattered the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
Since its emergence as an independent state in 1971, Bangladesh has so far succeeded in avoiding foreign policy mistakes of this magnitude. Still, several significant mistakes in Bangladesh鈥檚 foreign policy can be identified. These mistakes can be divided along two lines 鈥� theoretical and practical case-based.
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Theoretical mistakes
FIRST, since the independence of Bangladesh, the theoretical foundation of its foreign policy is primarily based on Article 25 of the constitution and the two maxims 鈥榝riendship to all, malice towards none鈥� and 鈥榥on-alignment.鈥� In reality, Bangladesh lacks any long-term foreign policy and instead, its foreign policy is conducted on day-to-day basis. Thus, Bangladesh has so far failed to develop a long-term, well-articulated and coherent foreign policy.
Second, apart from the concise Indo-Pacific outlook, Bangladesh has not yet managed to produce any strategy paper related to its foreign and security policy. Bangladesh鈥檚 Indo-Pacific outlook is not as comprehensive and focused as the US Indo-Pacific strategy, and it does not have a foreign policy concept, national security strategy, military doctrine, or naval doctrine.
Third, the political actors in Bangladesh have so far failed to reach a national consensus over foreign policy, because their views of what constitutes Bangladesh鈥檚 鈥榯rue鈥� interests differ widely. Consequently, the change of government in Bangladesh often results in substantial changes in its foreign policy, resulting in an incoherent and short-sighted foreign policy.
Finally, there is a strong tendency to prioritise regime interests over national interests among Bangladeshi policymakers. Accordingly, governments in Bangladesh sometimes pursue foreign policies to further their narrower party-political objectives at the expense of wider national interests.
Hence, the absence of a well-defined foreign policy, the failure to develop national strategy papers related to foreign policy, the lack of a national consensus and the prioritisation of regime interests over national interests have been major mistakes of Bangladesh鈥檚 foreign policy.
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Case-based mistakes
SINCE its independence, Bangladesh has made several mistakes in making foreign policy decisions on specific issues, and accordingly, it had to face severe consequences.
The decision to export jute and jute products to Cuba in 1974 proved to be a major political disaster for the country. Since Cuba was a communist state closely aligned with the USSR and was subject to a US economic blockade, the US retaliated by suspending food aid to Bangladesh. This, coupled with a devastating flood, contributed to a deadly famine in Bangladesh in 1974, which killed more than a million people. Ultimately, Bangladesh had to abandon its trade with Cuba to facilitate the resumption of US food aid. However, the famine played a significant role in fostering dissatisfaction among the people against the government and is considered to be a major contributing factor in the fall of the Sheikh Mujibur Rahman鈥檚 administration in August 1975.
Then comes the failure to repatriate stranded Pakistanis to Pakistan. During the late 1970s and 1980s, and again in the early 2000s, Bangladesh shared relatively cordial ties with Pakistan, yet Dhaka failed to exert significant political-diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to repatriate the stranded Pakistanis. Consequently, the stranded Pakistanis, often unintegrated into the mainstream society and involved in criminal activities.
Bangladesh鈥檚 inability to capitalise on the Afghan war (1979鈥�1989) proved to be a missed opportunity. During the Afghan war, Pakistan acted as a frontline state for the US and received billions of dollars and massive shipments of advanced weaponry in return. During the 1980s, Bangladesh strongly opposed the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and generally pursued a pro-US foreign policy. Initially, the US had accorded $80 million to Bangladesh in the context of the Afghan war, but the Ershad administration failed to capitalise on the crisis by gaining more economic and military aid from the western powers.
Furthermore, during this period, the government chose to turn a blind eye to the movement of volunteers from Bangladesh to Afghanistan. Later, these Afghan war veterans, known as the Mujahids, created violent extremist groups, such as the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami Bangladesh, which emerged as a serious national security threat to Bangladesh.
Failure to formulate a well-defined and long-term policy towards Myanmar in general and the Rakhine state/Arakan in particular has been a major foreign policy mistake. Bangladesh faced repeated influxes of Rohingya refugees from Arakan, including in 1978, 1991鈥�1997 and 2017鈥�2018, but has not developed a sustainable strategy to deal with the Rohingya crisis. Also, owing to the historical ties between Bengal and Arakan, Bangladesh had an opportunity to develop some sort of 鈥榮pecial relationship鈥� with the Arakanese, including both the Rakhines and the Rohingyas, but no concrete step has ever been undertaken by Dhaka in this direction.
Policy towards India, irrespective of the government in power in Dhaka, has not always succeeded in protecting the state鈥檚 national interests. In dealing with India, the governments led by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and the Jatiya Party have traditionally chosen balancing, while the governments led by the Bangladesh Awami League have usually opted for bandwagoning. Neither approach has achieved substantial success, as demonstrated by the regular killings of Bangladeshi civilians by the Indian Border Security Force, the persistent Indian refusal to share the waters of trans-boundary rivers, the continued Indian occupation of the South Talpatti Island and the Muhurir Char, the ongoing dispute about the continental shelf in the Bay of Bengal, and the growing anti-Bangladeshi rhetoric inside India. Meanwhile, Bangladesh has made substantial unilateral concessions to India, including the crackdown on northeastern Indian insurgents inside its territory and the provision of transit and transshipment facilities, but has received nothing of note in return. The failure to develop a robust foreign policy vis-脿-vis India and to utilise all instruments at its disposal, including international legal measures, has been a major mistake for Dhaka.
For the most part, Bangladesh鈥檚 policy vis-脿-vis the Russian-Ukrainian war has been a correct one. However, Dhaka missed an important opportunity. Following the outbreak of the Russian鈥揢krainian war, a number of states, including China, India, Brazil, Turkey and Pakistan, purchased large amount of crude oil from Russia at cheap prices, taking advantage of the western sanctions on Russia. Through this, they not only ensured their energy security but also earned hard currency by re-exporting some of the imported Russian crude oil to western states. However, Bangladesh failed to utilise the opportunity owing to the fear of western reactions and the reported inability of Bangladeshi oil refineries to refine Russian crude oil.
Taking into account the existing conditions in South Asia and the near-inoperativeness of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, the region is unlikely to witness regional integration in the foreseeable future. Since Bangladesh is located at the crossroads of South and Southeast Asia, Dhaka has an option to pursue a 鈥榣ook east鈥� policy with the view to closer integration with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. By doing so, Bangladesh can attempt to reduce its overdependence on India. However, Bangladesh has not accorded priority to its partnership with the ASEAN, and consequently, no notable progress has been made in this regard.
Bangladesh has been one of the foremost contributors of personnel to the United Nations peace operations in Africa. Yet, Bangladesh鈥檚 political, economic and security ties with sub-Saharan African states remain minimal and Dhaka has so far undertaken few initiatives to expand its diplomatic, economic and security footprints on the Sub-Saharan Africa. As the successes of Bangladeshi entrepreneurs in South Sudan indicate, Africa presents large-scale opportunities for the country. Dhaka has made a mistake in not identifying and utilizing these opportunities properly.
Finally, Bangladesh鈥檚 reactive policy towards its neighbourhood has been a serious weakness in its foreign policy. Bangladesh has two neighbours 鈥� India and Myanmar and the wider neighbourhood includes Nepal, Bhutan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Maldives and China. However, Bangladesh often lacks in-depth knowledge about its neighbours. In particular, Bangladesh lacks sufficient knowledge about the conditions in West Bengal, Northeast India, Rakhine state and Chin state, which share borders with Bangladesh. Consequently, Bangladesh is often confronted with foreign policy shocks from its immediate neighbourhood. For instance, the Arakan Army has been operating in the immediate vicinity of Bangladesh for more than a decade. Yet when the Arakan Army鈥檚 conquest of Maungdaw resulted in a new influx of Rohingya refugees into Bangladesh, it came as a shock to many Bangladeshis.
Since its independence, Bangladesh鈥檚 foreign policy has been based on weak theoretical foundations and its failure to articulate robust and interest-driven foreign policy in dealing with the great powers as well as neighbouring states, coupled with its propensity to miss or ignore new opportunities, have harmed the country鈥檚 national interests to a considerable degree. Accordingly, Bangladesh should formulate well-articulated, comprehensive and pragmatic foreign policy documents, stop conflating regime interests with national interests and be more calculative, proactive and interest-driven in implementing its foreign policy decisions.
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Md Himel Rahman is a Dhaka-based freelance analyst on international and strategic affairs.