Since the downfall of the former autocratic regime on August 5, 2024, law and order in Bangladesh have been in a state of decline, marked by increasing instability. In the months that followed, mob violence, extortion, and the rise of unruly factions became prevalent. The police force, once aligned with the former regime, has largely withdrawn from its duties, leaving a vacuum in security. This has fuelled widespread public resentment.
The immediate challenge is to restore the effectiveness of the police while simultaneously considering alternative approaches to bridge the law enforcement gap. A dual strategy 鈥� rebuilding police morale and bolstering community-led security initiatives 鈥� may offer the most pragmatic path forward.
Police confidence must be restored if the force is to regain public trust and resume its responsibilities. Many officers, fearing retribution or carrying the stigma of association with the former regime, have yet to return to duty 鈥� particularly those implicated in state repression. It is essential to draw a distinction between those involved in abuses and those who simply served within the system. Reassuring law-abiding officers that they will not be indiscriminately punished is the first step in reviving institutional morale.
Open and structured dialogue with the police force is vital. Interactive workshops at the sub-district and district levels 鈥� bringing together senior police officials, political leaders, professionals and community representatives 鈥� can create a platform for officers to express concerns and for the public to engage with law enforcement in a more constructive manner. Such initiatives can foster trust and encourage a more inclusive, transparent approach to policing.
At the same time, it would be a mistake to ignore the potential of community-led initiatives in safeguarding security. Rural Bangladesh has long relied on informal crime prevention systems. Traditionally, guards, locally known as 鈥榗howkidars鈥�, patrolled villages, with residents often contributing to security in rotational shifts. While these structures have weakened over time, the ethos of communal responsibility endures.
Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of the August events, communities spontaneously mobilised to protect neighbourhoods. In some areas, Hindu temples were guarded during Durga Puja by citizen volunteers, reflecting a deep cultural readiness to act in defence of collective security. Harnessing this latent capacity through structured, community-based programmes could serve as an effective complement to formal law enforcement.
Community policing and civilian-led defence mechanisms are not novel concepts. Countries such as the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia have long employed variations of these models. In conflict and post-crisis contexts, similar strategies have proved vital. During Egypt鈥檚 2011 revolution, for example, volunteer 鈥榩opular committees鈥� emerged to fill the security vacuum left by the police. Nigeria鈥檚 Civilian Joint Task Force, formed to combat Boko Haram, involved thousands of community members working in tandem with the military.
Bangladesh itself offers instructive examples. When police forces withdrew during recent instability, Ansar personnel secured key locations including police stations, traffic points and Dhaka鈥檚 international airport. In rural areas, members of the Village Defence Party protected religious minorities, while student-led initiatives helped maintain order, taking up roles from night patrols to traffic control.
Such civic efforts demonstrate that with proper organisation and support, communities can play a significant role in maintaining order, reducing crime and supplementing overstretched state institutions. These initiatives benefit from local knowledge and trust 鈥� qualities that state forces often lack鈥� enabling rapid, responsive interventions at the grassroots level.
Yet, to move from improvisation to institutionalisation, a multi-tiered model of security is necessary. While community policing structures technically exist, they remain under-resourced and marginalised. The Gram Police Act 2006 integrated chowkidars into the Union Parishad framework, but their operational capacity remains minimal. In contrast, the Ansar and VDP 鈥� disciplined, trained and embedded within communities 鈥� have repeatedly shown their potential in times of crisis.
A coherent community-driven law enforcement strategy would benefit all key stakeholders. The police could rebuild legitimacy through public engagement; the Ansar-VDP, with deeper empowerment, could expand their role in neighbourhood security; and the military, rather than being burdened with routine tasks, could remain a standby force for exceptional threats. Clear delineation of responsibilities is essential: civil defence units and Ansar-VDP should handle neighbourhood watch and public safety; police should focus on investigation and enforcement; and the military should retain rapid-response capacity.
At present, military personnel are engaged in duties better suited to civilian forces 鈥� guarding intersections and patrolling city roads. Such use of a strategic force is inefficient and unsustainable. Delegating these tasks to lightly armed patrol teams 鈥� comprising village police, VDP members and trained volunteers 鈥� would free up the military for operations that require specialised capacity. Strategic placement of rapid response units, guided by intelligence from civil patrols, would enhance readiness without overextension.
Nevertheless, this approach is not without challenges. Bangladesh鈥檚 politically charged environment creates risks of partisanship. Community policing must be insulated from political manipulation, lest it devolve into a mechanism for local strongmen or party loyalists to harass rivals. Transparent oversight and independent monitoring mechanisms are critical to ensure non-partisanship and to prevent the emergence of politicised militias.
Furthermore, the dangers of vigilantism cannot be ignored. The Nigerian CJTF, while effective, faced serious allegations of abuse, including extrajudicial killings. Bangladesh must learn from such experiences. Strong legal safeguards, active media scrutiny, and immediate disciplinary measures for misconduct are essential to uphold human rights and the rule of law. Community involvement must never substitute legal accountability.
For this strategy to succeed, broad-based civil participation and institutional support are imperative. Non-partisan civil society organisations, local government bodies and professional associations must play a central role in guiding and monitoring community defence initiatives.
Bangladesh now stands at a critical juncture. The disorder following political change has exposed institutional weaknesses 鈥� but it has also revealed the resilience and resourcefulness of its people. A community-centred security model, anchored in accountability and transparency, offers a realistic and democratic solution to our current crisis. It is not merely a stopgap measure for turbulent times, but a long-term opportunity to reimagine a more participatory and just system of law enforcement 鈥� one that serves, and is shaped by, the people it seeks to protect.
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Saifur Rahman is a senior IT specialist at the Australian Computer Society.