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The reform of the Constitution of Bangladesh is currently a very important and controversial issue. There is no major debate regarding the necessity of constitutional reform; all major political parties, civil society, and the public are more or less in agreement about the necessity of constitutional reform. The interim government has formed a reform commission which has already provided a set of recommendations. Among these recommendations, one very important recommendation is the formation of a bicameral legislature.

It has been stated in the recommendation that the legislature of Bangladesh will be composed of a lower house (the national parliament) and an upper house (senate), where the upper house will play a supportive role in legal scrutiny and establish a kind of balance through the control over executive power. The commission anticipates that the establishment of a bicameral legislature will enable fair representation of citizens, promote administrative accountability through inclusive and equitable policymaking, and eliminate the malpractice of making narrow and arbitrary decisions in legislation. The commission has provided detailed recommendations on the composition of both houses of the legislature; however, my discussion will focus solely on the composition of the upper house, the senate.

As per the commission’s recommendation, the upper house of the legislature — referred to as the senate — will consist of 105 members, 100 of whom will be elected through the proportional representation system based on the total votes received by political parties in the national parliament (lower house) election. However, to be eligible to send representatives to the upper house of the legislature, a political party must secure at least 1 per cent of the total votes cast in the lower house election. It has also been proposed in the recommendation that the remaining 5 members of the upper house or the senate will be nominated by the president; he will nominate 5 individuals who are not members of any house. It is noteworthy that, according to the commission’s proposal, at least 5 of the 100 members to be nominated to the upper house or the senate through the proportional representation system will represent socially and economically disadvantaged communities. The speaker of the upper house or the senate will be elected based on majority, and the deputy speaker will be elected from among the senate members who are not from the ruling party. This, in essence, is the proposed composition of the upper house, as outlined in the commission’s proposal.

Although there is consensus in the political arena on the necessity of a bicameral legislature in place of the currently existing unicameral legislature, there is a lack of consensus among the major political parties regarding the structural composition of the upper house. In particular, the largest political party at present, the BNP, which reasonably expects to win the next parliamentary election, has raised objections to the proportional representation system. The BNP wants representation in the upper house to be determined based on the number of seats received in the lower house, ie, the national parliament. The BNP may be expecting that as a potentially winning party or coalition, it will be able to nominate more than half of the members in the senate. On the other hand, comparatively smaller parties and the newly formed party, the NCP, want the provision of nominating the senate members through the proposed proportional representation system. These parties think that through this system, even with a small number of members in the lower house, they will be able to nominate several members to the upper house. In other words, political parties — both large and small — are adopting positions for or against the proportional representation system purely based on their party interests. Supporters of these parties, regardless of size, are also defending their positions on social media in an uncritical and non-academic manner. As a result, rather than engaging in critical and academic discussion, what we are witnessing is a bitter dispute.

As a politically conscious citizen of the country, I am interested in presenting my opinion on this matter. In this regard, I will criticise and oppose the proportional representation system; however, I do not fully adopt BNP’s position. Rather, based on the past political reality of Bangladesh, I want to highlight the problems of the proportional representation system and propose an alternative suggestion.

If we look at the national parliaments of Bangladesh formed through relatively acceptable elections, we can observe two realities: (1) the party or coalition that wins generally gets about 35–40 per cent of the total votes cast. (2) The opposition parties and coalitions oppose the ruling party in such a way (opposing every matter, continuous boycott of parliament, etc.) that at times the national parliament becomes almost non-functional. It will take time for us to come out of this reality. In such a situation, if the senate members are nominated through the proportional representation system, then most likely the ruling party or coalition will get a maximum of 40 senate members, which in the reality of Bangladesh may essentially turn the ruling party into a minority party in the senate. A guaranteed majority in the lower house and an almost certain minority in the upper house may create a terrible deadlock.

In contrast, BNP’s proposal would secure a guaranteed majority for the ruling party or coalition in both houses. This guaranteed majority in both houses could turn the upper house into a mere rubber-stamp body. This scenario is also undesirable. A balanced solution is necessary. In this regard, my alternative proposal is as follows: out of the total 100 members of the upper house, 85 members will be elected through a secret ballot by the members of the lower house. This election will be conducted by the Election Commission, not in the national parliament; members of parliament will vote independently and freely by secret ballot, and no provision that can create any obstacle to a member’s independent voting, such as Article 70 of the current constitution or any similar provision, will apply.

Along with this, a provision can be added that the composition of the senate must be completed within 15 days of the publication of the gazette of the national parliament election results. My proposed method will keep open the possibility of the ruling party being either in the majority or minority in the upper house. As a result, the kind of deadlock mentioned earlier can be mostly avoided, though not completely prevented. However, I believe this may be considered a somewhat better method than the proportional representation system.

Still, there are other problems. The commission’s recommendation states that political parties will nominate 100 candidates through the proportional representation system, with at least 5 of them representing socially and economically disadvantaged communities, as determined by law. While the proposal seems acceptable, a complication arises. This can be better understood through an example. Suppose the votes in the lower house election are as follows: Party A — 40 per cent, Party B — 30 per cent, Party C — 20 per cent, and Party D — 10 per cent. The questions then become: how will the 5 members representing socially and economically disadvantaged communities be nominated by each party? How will this allocation be determined? Any party may claim that it is eligible to nominate only 3 members. Then how many members of this category will this party nominate?

I believe the proportional representation system proposed by the commission does not effectively address this problem. However, the concept of inclusion outlined by the constitutional reform commission is logical. In this regard, I would like to present an alternative proposal, which, in my opinion, would be more inclusive. The proposal is as follows:

(1) The upper house or senate will be composed of a total of 100 members.

(2) Of these 100, 85 members will be elected through secret ballots cast independently and freely by the members of the lower house, with the election conducted by the Election Commission.

(3) Only those parties that have received at least 3 per cent of the total votes in the national parliament election will be eligible to nominate candidates.

(4) The 85 members will be candidates from various categories. For example: Open Category — 50 members, Teachers-Intellectuals-Lawyers — 5 members, Scientists, Agriculturists and Technologists — 5 members, Retired Professionals — 5 members, Journalists and Media Personalities — 5 members, Civil Society — 5 members, Business Leaders — 5 members, Minorities and Ethnic Communities — 5 members.

(5) The qualifications of candidates in each category will be determined by law.

(6) Among the remaining 15 members, 5 will be nominated by the president (selected, no election is required), 5 will be jointly nominated by the prime minister and the speaker (selected, no election is required), and the remaining 5 will be jointly nominated by the leader of the opposition in the lower house and the deputy speaker (selected, no election is required).

(7) Any individual who contested and lost in the immediately preceding lower house or the national parliament election, the newly elected members of which will elect the senate members, will not be eligible for nomination as a member of the upper house or the senate.

Ìý(8) The speaker and deputy speaker of the upper house or the senate will be elected through majority vote, with the condition that the speaker and deputy speaker will not be from the same party or coalition.

(9) The term of the upper house or the senate will end or the senate will be dissolved, within 15 days of the expiration or dissolution of the lower house or the National Parliament.

(10) The members of the upper house will be known as senators and will receive equal status and benefits as the members of the lower house or the national parliament.

Among the various advantages of the above-proposed composition of the upper house or the senate, I want to conclude my article by mentioning five: a) Most of the senators (85 out of 100) will be elected, rather than merely nominated by political parties. This will give them greater confidence in themselves. b) Both the ruling and opposition parties or coalitions will have the opportunity to secure a majority in the senate, fostering healthy political competition. c) The Senate will not become a dumping station for individuals defeated in the National Parliament election as those people who contested and lost in the immediately preceding lower house or the National Parliament election will not be eligible for nomination as a member of the upper house or the Senate. d) It will be far more inclusive than the senate proposed by the commission, as it includes various categories, with eligibility for each category determined by law. e) There will be a better chance of achieving coordination and balance between the lower and the upper houses, as the senators will be elected, not merely selected by the parties or coalitions, through an independent and free voting process. To sum up, the proposal to establish a bicameral legislature in Bangladesh is generally acceptable, with no major disagreement among the political parties. However, we must ensure that in our efforts to create a bicameral system, we do not inadvertently set up two conflicting legislative houses that lead to a deadlock. The state, politics, and the people should not become guinea pigs for a grand experiment.

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Dr Mostofa Nazmul Mansur is a professor of philosophy at Jahangirnagar University.