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SECULAR politics represents a decisive ideological stance. Such politics may not be expected to show an infatuation with any religion, religious views, or phenomena. In its firm commitment to materialism and worldliness, this political system is unlikely to indulge in the spiritual realm or subscribe to the existence of the hereafter.

But how would we react if we saw the secular camp of politics capitalising on religious symbols or wooing its ideological other? The politics in Bangladesh offers an opportunity for us to choose our reaction to such ideological detours. And this is what I would like to explore on this auspicious occasion of the anniversary of Bangladesh’s national independence.

Secularism is defined in many ways. However, the essence across various definitions may be the same. It is about excommunicating the religious or spiritual from the everydayness of public life. This is an ism about locking religion in the private domain and not letting it breathe outside. Of all the spheres of public life, politics should be freed from the tentacles of religion, as secularists demand.Ìý

The degree of separation of religion from politics may be far from clear. An absolute dividing line between them is perhaps hard to draw. Despite this reality, secular politics is widely subscribed to. For example, even when one of the key mantras of US politics is ‘In God we trust’, there is no question about its secular character. This much idealised home of democratic politics can wage ‘a holy war’ whenever required; its leaders can be divinely commissioned to invade countries of the infidels. They can still be considered secular because they prefer it that way.

I am, of course, more interested in local politics — the politics in Bangladesh. Bangladesh’s politics may not have a long history of secularism. Its earlier incarnation — East Pakistan — was happy to join the Pakistan Federation, which was formed based on religion at the 1947 partition. I have often wondered whether it would have been possible to demand a more secular and less communal third country (instead of two born out of the much-debated two-nation theory) as the British were leaving us. Anyway, we may talk about different historical possibilities, but we can’t redraw the borders now.

Secularism was enshrined in independent Bangladesh as one of the four state principles. The principle might have been a preferred response to our experience under intercolonial Pakistani rule. This ‘colonial’ experience in a post-colonial context might have taught us about the imperative of keeping religion away from politics. Pakistan might not have been a model of an Islamic state, but the Bangla-speaking East Pakistanis deserved better treatment in the federated nation, which was created to pursue Islamic norms and values.

It may be unreasonable to ask how secularism fared in the first few years of the new nation before this state principle was uninstalled following the killing of Bangabandhu. However, it can be noted that secularism has exhibited two characteristics since it was replaced by the principle of Islamic faith following the 1975 regime change. First, secularism has become a political capital for the Bangladesh Awami League. This party has been its chief custodian. For any other political entity to claim secularism, it would be considered politically incorrect. The association of Awami politics with secularism has been normalised over the past decades.

The other characteristic of secularism in Bangladesh is more remarkable. Although it generally means separation of politics from any religion, practically it has meant distancing from Islam only. For example, it is common for dominant secular discourses in the country to sympathise with other religions; any such emotional affiliation or social engagement with Islam may be prohibited as non-secular. In other words, secularism may be reconciled with other religions — folk or formal — but not with Islam.

Awami politics in the past few decades has provided an interesting tale of secularism in Bangladesh.

Just a few weeks ago, a fire incident in Dhaka killed about four dozen people. The tragedy exposed the government’s poor management of such accidents on the one hand and the lack of monitoring of building security and safety on the other. Amid the public outcries, the government arranged a digital display of fire incidents in the parliament house. These fire events were allegedly attributed to the opposition camp, including the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, in the past few years. In commenting on this ‘fire terrorism’, the prime minister regarded the BNP as the ‘Azrael’ or the archangel of death. According to the Abrahamic faiths, death is attributed to the arrival of this angel, who snatches away human souls when their terms come to an end. The angel, of course, does this at the command of God, who is the owner of all lives.

Such representation of the main opposition by the party in power is interesting. The establishment politics in Bangladesh have long passed the stage of showing even an iota of respect for its political oppositions. While there are no longer any expectations of respect from the top of the leadership, the comparison appears utterly despicable. The wisdom behind the reference to the angelic world is also unclear. It may be that those with discursive power to represent others have exhausted all worldly references, and therefore they need to explore linguistic and communicative resources from the other world.

Although this other-worldly indulgence may not be rare in Bangladeshi politics, we wouldn’t expect it from a political party that has established a monopoly on secularism. Secularism is their political trademark. However, when a trader in secularism also trades in religious commodities, it may point to their intellectual and semiotic bankruptcy.

Fortunately for the AL, such ideological border violations — resorting to religion while claiming secularism as their political enterprise — does not attract much reaction from the public. This is due to the state of the rule of law, which has muzzled people’s voices and right to speak. Such acts of border violation would have drawn a lot of flak for other parties in other regimes. The reader would remember how the media and the intelligentsia targeted a BNP home minister about two decades ago when he was trying to explain an unnatural death by referring to God’s ownership of all lives and His unquestionable right to take away any life at any time.Ìý

Another example of an ideological border violation is related to the election symbol of the Awami League, which is the boat. Many tales have been told about this boat, which stands for all things good — peace, development, democracy, smooth sailing, inclusivity, and what not. However, such indexicality is deemed insufficient. There is a need to represent the boat as a religious and prophetic symbol as well. During the most recent national elections, colloquially referred to as the ‘dummy’ election, the custodian of the boat symbol urged people to vote for the boat, saying it was not an ordinary boat. It was the boat of Prophet Nuh (Noah) (peace be upon him). A boat constructed under divine order and guidance can help believing passengers navigate through the earth-swallowing deluge. Would we expect a secularist party to exploit such religious references?

Ironically, there may be little use of a boat in the context of the looming deforestation, thanks to the contribution of the ‘friend’ in the neighbourhood who is draining out river water upstream. Similarly, urging people to vote is vacuous, as the sanctity of the core democratic process has been severely damaged.

The non-secular engagement of the champion of secularism is also demonstrated by its relationship with some other political parties. For decades, the Awami League has maintained ambiguous relationships with political parties that use Islam as their guiding principle and goal. While the AL denounces such politics of religion in one breath, it utilises them at every critical moment of its election need in another.Ìý

The Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami is the main religion-based political party with a demonstrated voter base in the country. The Awami position is crystal clear on Jamaat: the former can’t have any relationship with the latter, which is represented as non-secular as well as communal and anti-liberation forces. However, the AL had a warm political relationship with the Jamaat during the 1991–1996 BNP rule. In fact, the very idea of the caretaker government, which was the key Awami demand that brought it to the seat of power, was borrowed from the Jamaat. The AL smuggled the Jamaati idea and made it their own agenda, given its strong political foundation and its support in the media. The two secular and non-secular parties worked together, aiming to dethrone the BNP and holding elections under a caretaker government. AL leaders were found seeking Jamaat blessings for their political ambition of unseating the BNP and walking up the stairs to power.

The AL strategy worked. Riding on the demand for a caretaker government, it succeeded in mobilising public opinion for election under a neutral election-time government in 1996. The AL returned to power after more than two decades, experiencing the party’s regeneration after the 1975 tragedy.

However, the ruling AL (1996–2000) formed a different kind of relationship with the Jamaat. As the BNP was in the opposition camp, the Jamaat now developed a political relationship with it, a relationship that was comparable to the AL-Jamaat alliance during the 1991–96 period. However, the BNP-Jamaat alliance was worrying for the future of the AL. Therefore, it invested in reinvigorating anti-liberation and fundamentalist discourses to demonise the Jamaat.

The election victory of the BNP-Jamaat alliance in 2001 might have permanently soured the relationship between the AL and the Jamaat. The tumultuous years of BNP-Jamaat rule (2001–2006) resulted in deep political crises. The events of 9/11 changed the world and the future of any Islam-leaning political parties in Muslim societies. Bangladesh lost control of its own politics, which came under the veiled control of regional powers widely supported by western governments.

The changing world reinvigorated Awami politics once again, as it was elected to power in 2008 with wide support from regional and western powers. The Awami League, when it returned to power for the second time, redefined its relationships with religiously affiliated political parties. Whether it was its own choice, a dictation from outside, or both, delegitimising the Jamaat became one of the core missions of the Awami League. In the process, many top leaders of Jamaat for their role as war collaborators, were brought to justice, but the legal proceedings, as many national and international jurists suggest, were at times flawed. The AL has now re-emerged as super-secular in the eyes of its external backers.

Publicly, the AL now projects a firm position against religion-based politics. The BNP has been castigated a million times for its alliance with the Jamaat. In the eyes of Awami leaders, the BNP is also a non-secular force that ought to be eliminated from politics by all means.

Nevertheless, when the need arises, the AL may not deprive itself of the opportunity of dating religious partners. When elections are boycotted by the BNP and other parties, the gates of the secular boat are opened to accommodate parties of all hues and colours. The sharing of the stage with religious groups in public meetings indicates this openness about embracing non-secular camps.

Perhaps the most noteworthy case of the otherworldliness of Awami politics is its spoken and unspoken ties with the Bharatiya Janata Party in India. In recent years, the Awami League has been trying to win the sympathy and support of the BJP government led by Narendra Modi. So, one wonders how an ultra-secular party can maintain a heart-to-heart relationship with an ultra-Hindu supremacist party like the BJP. Under the BJP’s rule, hatred of Muslims in India has been institutionalised, and it is known universally, as it seeks to build an India only for Hindus. When at the policy level, extreme discriminatory views against Muslims are cultiavted, how can it nurture a loving relationship with them outside Indian borders? It is this strong anti-Muslim position that has led the BJP to side with Israel against the Palestinians.

What happens to the Muslim and secular identities of the AL leaders when they woo the BJP leaders? They can’t engage with the latter with their secular or Muslim hats on. And given the unequal power relations between them, the AL can’t impose any identity of its choice on the BJP. Therefore, the AL is likely to interact with the BJP on the latter’s terms. In doing so, their secularised Muslim identity has to submit to the non-secular safronisation ideology pursued by the BJP.

Secular politics is an interesting political beast in Bangladesh. It will meet the non-secular either with a dagger or a bouquet of flowers, depending on the spatio-temporal context and dynamics of the encounter.

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Obaidul Hamid is an associate professor at the University of Queensland in Australia. He researches language, education, and society in the developing world.