MORE than a decade back, we wrote in this paper that the idea of the state alone having the right to own and run governance institutions, particularly at the grass roots, was not practical and others could be used. I, in particular, suggested non-governmental organisations that had direct experience on both the grass roots and micro-governance. And, they were definitely better connected to consumers.
Thanks to the editor of this paper for publishing that piece although he was strongly against the idea. I have been dropped by many outfits for my 鈥榗ontroversial鈥� views on various issues but not by this paper. Given the current reality, the time has come to discuss governance monopoly limitations again.
听
Governance structure: state and society
THE concept of the currently dominating governance structure is largely derived from northern/European history based on the historical experience and aspiration of various ruling classes. The theme of the supremacy of state institutions over the rest, particularly feudal ones which were also micro governance structures, is the key.
Feudal power peaked with the Magna Carta whereupon the powers of the king were limited but with the rise of capitalism, central authority automatically grew and the 鈥榬ule of law鈥� regime became supreme. The Magna Carta limited the king鈥檚 power by law, but when the law itself became supreme, the implementers of the law became supreme, too.
Thus, the root of supreme central power also lay in the same document. And, it is the formulators of this concept that led the charge of colonialism. The key to state supremacy is central authority claimed through the idea of supremacy of the 鈥榬ule of law鈥�. Over time, it has moved from the secular to the divine authority space, putting outside any challenges to the concept. It reached most of the world through colonial channels.
听
Derivative colonial state
THE ruling classes are, of course, committed to it as it is their source of accessing power, hence resources. The governance model is now a theological structure like the church, headed by the idea of the state as supreme, the holy book as the constitution and the governance structure consisting of the four major players 鈥� the armed forces, the bureaucracy, money makers and politicians as the Vatican officials structured along classical forms of European church and society.
To this, of course, is attached the media and the academia that provide the technical support 鈥� the lesser clergy 鈥� by insisting on the model鈥檚 superiority fulfilling the task of the 鈥榮ermon鈥�, sharing their role with several of the main players. These are not water-tight but loyalty to the governance model is the same.
听
Cost of governance and alternatives
NOBODY, including the experts, has said that the state-driven governance structure has worked well. The public has a much harsher conclusion. However, in some cases, when there has been partnership, there are some successes mostly in the health sector such as immunisation. But, this was possible because society led the mobilisation and the government role was largely limited to hardware delivery. The services were possible because of an alliance with rural organic governance units like the salish and matbars. It was never dependent on state institutions for success.
Similarly, rural poverty was not reduced by any government projects but by self-generated actions, whether migration or commercial agriculture. Research also shows the government, including local governments, extracts payments for services rendered, making every aspect of socio-economic inequality inefficient and expensive.
The state is now focusing on registration through digitisation in an attempt to reduce the organic behaviourial space of society but not replace it as it does not have capacity. That it has not improved governance but increased 鈥榗orruption鈥� is conveniently ignored by the state community and its theologians.
听
Outsourcing governance?
STATE-BASED governance is both costly and inefficient and non-accountable to service buyers. Micro level reviews show people do not think any governance-related product is a service by the state as they have to pay for it all, except education. But education is for income and not 鈥榣earning鈥� which is difficult to accept by theologians. But most statists are in denial that the state services delivery agencies have already been commercialised and, like any state-owned banks, is a source of income for those who work there or are linked to them.
There is no practical contest against this model as the state is considered the only possible controller of governance, beyond scrutiny, hence holy. In Bangladesh, what is called 鈥榗orruption鈥� is a by-product of its governance performance. Corruption is fine, but it is also inefficient and without any competition from other governance institutions, hence not motivated to perform.
There is nothing to be lost in trying out a partial privatiszation of governance, both non-governmental organisations and the private sector at the micro level. Social governance already exists. So, it is not a new concept. The cost calculation of current governance cost is important including corruption. Based on that, various non-state actors, including cooperatives and local shareholders, can be asked to bid based on payment against services. In a way, this will be the ownership transfer of governance to citizens.
However, as it is a threat to the state theology beneficiaries, the chances of this happening is low but as efficiency falls and corruption-related cost rises, chances grow every day.
听
Afsan Chowdhury is a researcher and journalist.
